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Adversary Breakdown and Judicial Role Confusion in 
“Small Case” Civil Justice 
Jessica K. Steinberg* 
This Article calls attention to the breakdown of adversary procedure 
in a largely unexplored area of the civil justice system: the ordinary, two-
party case. The twenty-first century judge confronts an entirely new state 
of affairs in presiding over the average civil matter. In place of the 
adversarial party contest, engineered and staged by attorneys, judges now 
face the rise of an unrepresented majority unable to propel claims, facts, 
and evidence into the courtroom. The adversary ideal favors a passive 
judge, but the unrealistic demands of such a paradigm in today’s “small 
case” civil justice system have sparked role confusion among judges, who 
find it difficult to both maintain stony silence and reach merits-based 
decisions in the twelve million cases involving unrepresented parties.  
This Article contends that the adversary ideal is untenable in the 
lower civil courts. Appellate courts and ethics bodies have virtually 
ignored this problem, with the result that judges are left to improvise a 
solution.  Indeed, it is now routine for judges to flout tradition and 
doctrine by concocting ad hoc and unregulated procedures that assist the 
unrepresented with fact development and issue creation. This Article 
argues that such efforts should be formalized and regularized through an 
affirmative duty on judges to develop the factual record in cases that arise 
in lower civil courts. In complex federal litigation, adversary norms have 
evolved, and the judicial role has been greatly enhanced to manage the 
unique pre- and post-trial needs of cases with numerous parties and high 
public impact. This Article argues for a parallel framework to enlarge 
the role of the judge in small, two-party civil cases. An affirmative duty 
may chafe against orthodox notions of the judge as a “passive arbiter,” 
but it would harmonize the disparate procedural practices already in use 
in the lower courts, and go a long way toward resurrecting the procedural 
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am grateful for comments and suggestions provided by Juliet Brodie, Phyllis Goldfarb, Colleen 
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to Madeleine MacNeil, Elyse Schoenfeld, and Natasha Baker. 
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values of accuracy, impartiality, party voice, and transparency in civil 
adjudication. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Article calls attention to the breakdown of adversary 
procedure in a largely unexplored area of the civil justice system: the 
ordinary, two-party case. The twenty-first century judge confronts an 
entirely new state of affairs in presiding over the average civil matter. 
In place of the adversarial party contest, engineered and staged by 
attorneys, judges now face the rise of an unrepresented majority 
unable to propel claims, facts, and evidence into the courtroom. The 
adversary ideal favors a passive judge, but the unrealistic demands of 
such a paradigm in most civil cases have sparked role confusion among 
judges, who find it difficult to both maintain stony silence and also 
reach merits-based decisions in the sixteen million cases involving 
unrepresented parties.1 In complex civil litigation, the role of the judge 
has been greatly enhanced to respond to the unique needs of cases 
with multiple parties and high public impact.2 This Article argues for 
a parallel framework to enlarge the role of the judge in the “small case” 
civil justice system. 
In the classic portrayal of American adversary procedure, parties 
and judges each have distinct and well-defined roles. Parties are 
expected to control investigation, define the issues at stake in the case, 
and present evidence and argument to the court.3 Judges, by contrast, 
serve as passive and impartial arbiters who weigh the parties’ 
competing claims from a neutral perch. In an oft-cited metaphor, 
judges are like “umpires” calling balls and strikes—they make 
decisions based on the facts and theories advanced by the parties, but 
play no independent role in shaping the content or outcome of cases.4  
Though adversary theory continues to represent the guiding 
framework for criminal and civil cases, it is now widely recognized that 
the traditional depiction of the passive judge is incomplete. In “big” 
 
 1. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN STATE 
COURTS 31–33 (2015), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Research/CivilJusticeR
eport-2015.ashx [hereinafter THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION]. 
 2. See infra Part II. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
20–21 (1993). 
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litigation—namely, cases involving multiple parties, far-reaching 
remedies, or matters of great public importance—an enhanced, and 
more active, judicial role has become the norm. In her seminal work, 
Judith Resnik discussed the rise of the “managerial” judge who is 
deeply involved in pre-trial discovery disputes, class certifications, and 
settlement.5 Likewise, Abram Chayes depicted a judge who plays an 
active post-trial role in public law cases, particularly in those that call 
for the restructuring of large public institutions such as schools or 
prisons.6 In addition, scholars have pointed out that appellate courts 
sometimes depart from adversary norms in furtherance of their 
important law development function.7 Where a case will bind a large 
segment of the American public, appellate judges might raise a legal 
issue sua sponte, or rely on extra-record facts, so as to ensure the 
issuance of a proper, and well-informed, statement of the law.8 
Adversary departures are often justified as an appropriate response to 
the growing complexity of civil litigation as well as the courts’ now-
central role in public law enforcement. 
Beyond “big” or “important” litigation, however, adversary 
norms in the civil justice system are largely expected to operate in 
conformity with traditional notions. Consider a simple consumer case, 
in which New Bank sues Kathleen for $2,500 in credit card debt. In 
such a matter, none of the typical justifications for departures from 
adversary procedure exist. First, pre-trial proceedings are likely to be 
minimal. New Bank and Kathleen are the only two parties to the 
litigation, making it unnecessary for the judge to actively manage 
technical procedures such as joinder or class action certification. 
Second, the sole issue in the case—liability for the debt—is not 
complex and, therefore, the parties are unlikely to engage in extensive 
discovery requiring judicial intervention. Third, any court-ordered 
remedy can be privately enforced by New Bank, without the judicial 
monitoring that would be required in a large public law case. And last, 
the judge in the New Bank case primarily fulfills a dispute-resolution 
function, rather than a law development function, eliminating the 
 
 5. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376–79 (1982). 
 6. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1281, 1298 (1976) [hereinafter Chayes, Role]. 
 7. See infra, Section II.B. 
 8. Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 447, 461–62 (2009). 
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need for the court to raise issues or facts not brought forward by the 
parties. In short, a basic debt collection case is neither complex, nor 
does it invoke a matter of public importance. The presumption thus 
holds that, across the lifespan of a simple, two-party matter, the twin 
adversary norms of “party control” and “passive judging” do—and 
should—govern the proceedings.9 
This Article challenges the validity of that presumption, asserting 
that, far from a segregated phenomenon affecting only large and 
important cases, active judging has become routine in many small, 
two-party cases as well. Matters like the New Bank case may not raise 
issues of complexity or public importance, but they are part and parcel 
of a sea change in the civil trial courts that has greatly affected 
procedural methods: the emergence of an unrepresented majority. In 
the past twenty years, skyrocketing figures of unrepresented, or pro se, 
litigants have swamped the civil courts, primarily in ordinary, two-
party matters at the state level. Based on a survey of nearly one million 
cases in 152 courts, The National Center for State Courts recently 
estimated that seventy-six percent of cases in the civil justice system 
now involve an unrepresented party.10 In some case types, such as 
consumer law, housing, or domestic violence, pro se parties may be 
featured in up to ninety percent of matters.11 It is therefore highly 
likely that at least sixteen million unrepresented parties cycle through 
the civil justice system annually.12 This Article connects mass-scale lack 
of representation to an observable, yet overlooked, breakdown in 
adversary procedure in run-of-the-mill cases. In doing so, this Article 
suggests that departures from adversary procedure may run far deeper 
than previously recognized. 
 
 9. By “small” and “simple,” I do not mean to suggest that the cases lack significance. 
They are critically important to people’s lives, but relatively easier to adjudicate due to simple 
issues of fact and law. See David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of 
Habitability, 99 CAL. L. REV. 389, 413–14 (2011) (discussing the simple nature of eviction 
cases, as compared to other civil and criminal cases). 
 10. THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 1, at 31–32 (finding that, in the 
subset of 649,811 cases where courts reported representation status for both parties, only 24% 
of cases involved representation for the plaintiff and defendant). 
 11. See infra notes 86–97 and accompanying text. 
 12. In 2013, 22.1 million civil and domestic relations cases were filed in the state courts. 
I derive the sixteen million figure by taking seventy-six percent of 22.1 million. See NAT’L CTR. 
FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS 7 (2015), http://www.
courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/EWSC_CSP_2015.ashx [hereinafter 
EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS]. 
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The pro se crisis is well recognized,13 but its profound implications 
for the viability of the adversary system at large are not. The adversary 
norm of party control requires that parties draft court papers, parse 
through substantive law, master procedural and evidentiary rules, and 
articulate a coherent, legally relevant narrative to a judge. However, 
lay parties, who now dominate the civil dockets, are frequently unable 
to perform any of these functions. They regularly omit relevant facts. 
They fail to advance cognizable legal theories. They botch procedural 
and evidentiary rules. And they request improper remedies.14 In a 
domino-like effect, when parties lack skill and cannot harness the norm 
of party control to develop or present their claims, the passive judging 
model no longer functions as an effective corollary. A judge who 
abides by the passive norm in presiding over a contemporary civil 
docket would likely spend the majority of her day briskly dismissing 
the claims of unrepresented parties—a result that hardly seems 
consistent with the adversary system’s overarching goal to produce fair 
and merits-based decisions. Yet a dilemma exists: if that judge 
intervenes in a case to elicit facts and frame legal theories—to supplant, 
in essence, the duties typically carried out by the parties—she has then 
abandoned her neutral and impartial perch. 
The various entities that regulate judicial conduct have grappled 
poorly with the catch-22 that arises for the judge when an 
unrepresented party cannot fulfill the norm of party control. For 
starters, few ethics rules or appellate decisions even address the issue, 
despite how pervasive it has become in everyday litigation. In addition, 
the guidance that has emerged is inadequate. Courts often issue 
opinions laden with stock language advising judges to adhere to 
adversary procedure but also to ensure that substantial justice is 
achieved—yet instruction on how to strike this balance is typically 
 
 13. See Stephan Landsman, The Growing Challenge of Pro Se Litigation, 13 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 439 (2009); Joy Moses, Grounds for Objection: Causes and Consequences of 
America’s Pro Se Crisis and How to Solve the Problem of Unrepresented Litigants, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS (June 2011), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/
2011/06/pdf/objection.pdf; LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN 
AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS (Sept. 
2009), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/PublicDo
cuments/JusticeGaInAmerica2009.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 14. Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47 CONN. L. 
REV. 741, 755–56 (2015) 
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scarce.15 New amendments to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct 
purport to resolve the dilemma by advising judges that it is not a 
violation of adversary norms to extend low-level “accommodations” 
to pro se litigants in order to promote their participation in a case.16 
However, the recommended accommodations—limited to relaxing 
the use of jargon, making referrals to a lawyer, and explaining basic 
procedure17—do little to help develop meritorious claims or nudge 
judges closer to accurate decisions. Indeed, courts and ethics bodies 
seem to cleave to the assumption that, with a small dose of judicial 
explanation or civility, unrepresented litigants will go on to 
competently present the facts and issues in their cases—and thus, the 
delicate ecology of the adversary system remains intact. 
Scholars have celebrated the accommodation approach for 
injecting a measure of flexibility into the judicial role, but in fact, it 
papers over the depth of adversary process failure in the civil trial 
courts. It is true that the unrepresented are inexpert in the procedural 
realm, and a judicial accommodation may tackle that issue at the 
margins. However, many unrepresented parties struggle to fulfill a far 
more important and fundamental task: developing the legal and 
factual content of their cases. It is not uncommon for a pro se litigant 
to stare blankly at a judge and utter the words “I’m not sure what to 
do next.” Even more frequently, unrepresented parties deliver 
unfocused narratives, skip over key legal elements, or offer information 
that lacks sufficient specificity to meet the requisite burden of proof. 
To return to the New Bank case, a judicial accommodation might help 
Kathleen—a debtor who is highly likely to be unrepresented—amend 
her complaint,18 format her pleading,19 or digest the contents of a 
ruling laden with legal terminology.20 But it will not ensure that 
Kathleen is able to raise the defense that the debt calculation is wrong, 
the debt is owed by someone else, or the statute of limitations has 
expired. Furthermore, a procedural accommodation will not assist 
Kathleen in amassing evidence and case law to support her position in 
court. In short, the accommodation doctrine grossly over-simplifies 
 
 15. See infra Section IV.A. 
 16. See infra Section IV.B. 
 17. See infra Section IV.B. 
 18. Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987). 
 19. Collins v. Arctic Builders, 957 P.2d 980, 982 (Alaska 1998), aff’d, 31 P.3d 1286 
(Alaska 2001). 
 20. Gamet v. Blanchard, 91 Cal. App. 4th 1276, 1284–85 (2001). 
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the breakdown of the party control norm and the appropriate 
judicial response. 
This Article argues that scholars, courts, and ethics bodies have 
perpetuated an adversary mirage in small case civil justice at a 
significant cost. Drawing on examples from the field, I contend that, 
in many small, two-party cases, judges are responding to an inflexible 
passive norm by abandoning it entirely. In some matters, judges 
extensively question parties and witnesses. In others, they relax or 
eliminate procedural and evidentiary rules. In still others, they raise 
new legal theories to fit the parties’ facts or order relief not requested. 
Judicial reliance on a range of disparate strategies is ad hoc and 
inconsistent across cases involving the unrepresented. A single judge 
might treat two unrepresented litigants in back-to-back proceedings 
entirely differently, or offer more assistance to certain parties than to 
others similarly situated. One may debate whether the “active” judicial 
practices I detail are fair, or likely to produce an accurate result, but it 
should not be controversial to assert that basic hearing procedures are 
best not carried out in extemporized, unregulated fashion. 
In the narrative of American procedure, the simple, two-party case 
has been cast as the foil to complex litigation—the setting in which 
adversary norms continue to thrive without the need for substantial 
modification. The reality is that, in a preponderance, if not a large 
majority, of two-party civil cases, adversary norms are breaking down, 
and upholding the passive “ideal” only deepens judicial role 
confusion, forces judges to operate in the shadow of unworkable 
standards of conduct, and fragments procedure into a collection of 
changing rules. In big litigation, adversary theory and doctrine have 
evolved to redefine the role of the judge and set new cultural 
expectations for active court involvement in case development. A 
similar transformation is needed in small cases to account for the 
millions of unrepresented parties who cannot advance their own facts 
and legal theories. 
This Article argues that the best available option is the imposition 
of an affirmative duty on judges to develop the factual and legal record 
in cases involving unrepresented parties in “majority pro se courts.”21 
 
 21. I borrow the term “majority pro se courts” from Professor Benjamin Barton, who has 
used it to describe courts in which most litigants are consistently unrepresented.  Benjamin H. 
Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for Pro Se Court Reform), 62 FLA. L. REV. 1227, 1227 
n.2 (2010). 
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The affirmative judging model I suggest is closely aligned with 
procedures already employed at Social Security disability hearings and 
would regularize judicial practices that are currently guided by instinct 
and knee-jerk reaction. Some judges are already pursuing this option 
out of sheer necessity—as they must if they aim to base their decisions 
on the relevant facts and law. Active judicial development of the record 
may chafe against orthodox notions of adversary procedure, but would 
go a long way toward resurrecting the basic procedural values of 
uniformity, transparency, impartiality, and party voice in small case 
civil justice. 
Part II of this Article describes traditional adversary procedure, 
focusing on the typical presumption that it functions optimally in two-
party cases—despite departures that have become standard in the 
arena of big litigation. Part III challenges the accuracy of that 
presumption, contending that the unrepresented majority in today’s 
civil justice system has triggered a collapse in adversary norms in 
regular, everyday litigation. Part IV examines the insufficient judicial 
role modifications proposed by courts and ethics bodies to prop up 
the flagging adversary system and suggests that the over-simplified 
response has obscured the degree of process failure in many two-party 
matters. In Part V, I identify three major costs of imposing outdated 
adversary theory and doctrine on the lower civil courts. First, judges 
depart sharply from the passive norm—and do so in an ad hoc manner. 
Second, their improvised procedures do not always advance a fair 
result. And third, a divide between theory and practice provokes 
judicial role confusion and aggravates the trend toward rogue judging. 
Lastly, Part VI proposes the affirmative judging framework. It is 
critical that judges gather the information they need to decide cases 
fairly, and yet, it is also important that judges are guided by an above-
board standard of conduct that can be reviewed and honed by the 
appellate courts. An affirmative duty brings together these strands. 
Further, it promotes procedural values that existing norms of conduct 
do not, and encourages a type of adversary evolution that has long 
been documented—and justified—in “big” or “important” cases. 
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II. ADVERSARY PROCEDURE: TRADITIONS, DEPARTURES, AND 
PRESUMPTIONS 
A. Traditions 
Adversary procedure underpins the American civil justice system. 
In the idealized rendering, the parties are in charge of all aspects of 
litigation and the judge refrains from active participation in the case 
until a decision must be issued.22 The norm of party control, as it is 
sometimes called, is a shorthand way of expressing the expectation that 
parties will assume full responsibility for investigating their cases, 
presenting evidence through examination and cross-examination of 
witnesses, and determining the nature and sequence of legal issues to 
be decided by the court.23 In conjunction, the passive judging norm 
expresses our collective understanding that the proper role of the 
judge is to receive and process evidence and argument, but not to be 
actively involved in investigating or shaping the development of 
either.24 Adversary procedure is often contrasted with inquisitorial 
procedure—common in Europe—where the judge investigates facts, 
determines which evidence and witnesses will play a role in the 
proceedings, and is charged with ferreting out the truth through active 
examination of the parties.25 
 
 22. See Frost, supra note 8, at 457–58 (“Party control over case presentation is described 
as an essential aspect of the American adversarial system.”); Resnik, supra  note 5, at 382 (stating 
that the main idea behind the adversary system is that “parties, not the judge, have the major 
responsibility for and control over the definition of the dispute.”); Ellen E. Sward, Values, 
Ideology and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 302 (1988)  [hereinafter 
Sward, Values] (“The adversary system is characterized by party control of the investigation and 
presentation of evidence and argument . . . .”). 
 23. Frost, supra note 8, at 457–58; Resnik, supra note 5, at 382; Sward, supra note 22, 
at 302. 
 24. See Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 
1031, 1038 (1975); STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE 
AMERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 2–4 (1988) [hereinafter LANDSMAN, READINGS]. 
 25. See Renée Lettow Lerner, The Intersection of Two Systems: An American on Trial for 
an American Murder in the French Cour d’Assises, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 791, 797–98, 801–02 
(2001); MARY ANN GLENDON,  PAOLO G. CAROZZA & COLIN B. PICKER, COMPARATIVE 
LEGAL TRADITIONS IN A NUTSHELL 98 (3rd Ed.2008). 
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In the traditional depiction of adversary procedure, the judge 
remains passive throughout the life of a legal case.26 In the pre-trial 
period, this means that the judge refrains from engaging the facts and 
issues in a case. The parties might file a complaint and answer, conduct 
fact investigation, propound discovery, and discuss settlement—all 
without the case being brought before a judge.27 Similarly, at trial, the 
parties have wide latitude to determine which evidence and issues to 
bring to the court’s attention, and judges are expected to hold back 
from interjecting in the parties’ presentation of facts and arguments.28 
Finally, in post-judgment proceedings, the judge’s role continues to 
be passive. Any relief awarded, either through settlement or court 
order, is up to the prevailing party to enforce. The judge is not 
permitted to investigate compliance or assist a party in obtaining a 
court-ordered remedy, except within the bounds of a formal 
enforcement action that itself is governed by adversary procedure.29 
Adversary norms are premised on the notion that passive judges 
are better able to remain neutral in adjudicating a matter.30 An active 
judge risks formulating theories of liability before all evidence has been 
adduced, and might inadvertently elicit information from the parties 
in a way that simply builds upon early assumptions.31 The tendency to 
seek out information that affirms one’s beliefs, known as 
“confirmation bias,” has the potential to compromise impartial 
decision-making.32 Lon Fuller best expressed the hazards of 
 
 26. Stephan A. Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary System, 44 
OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 714–15 (1983) [hereinafter Landsman, Brief Survey]. 
 27. See Frankel, supra note 24, at 1042; Resnik, supra note 5, at 384–85. 
 28. The Supreme Court regularly refers to the principle that courts are “limited to 
addressing the claims and arguments advanced by the parties.” Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. 
Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011). 
 29. Chayes, Role supra note 6 at 1042 (contrasting public law litigation with traditional 
litigation, where a judgment terminates the judge’s involvement in the matter). 
 30. See Frankel, supra note 24, at 1045 n.27; LANDSMAN, READINGS, supra note 24, at 
2, 77. 
 31. See Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 44 (Harold J. 
Berman ed., 1961 rev. vol. 7) (“An adversary presentation seems the only effective means for 
combating this natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which 
is not yet fully known.”); Landsman, Brief Survey, supra note 26, at 713–15; see also Monroe 
Freedman, Our Constitutionalized Adversary System, 1 CHAP. L. REV. 57, 76 (1998). 
 32. Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in 
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 305–07 (discussing the Central Park Jogger Case). 
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diminishing the parties’ role in favor of greater judicial control.33 He 
warned that “at some early point a familiar pattern will seem to emerge 
from the evidence,” and a judge who controls case development might 
not search for evidence that runs counter to her preliminary 
assessment of the case.34 Adversary norms hold that a judge who has 
no prior exposure to the facts or issues in the case at the time formal 
proceedings commence will be able to withhold judgment until the 
parties have set forth their legal theories and supported them in full.35 
Adversary theory retains both historical and present-day currency, 
and is often articulated as a fundamental tenet of American 
adjudication. The twin norms of party control and passive judging 
date back to the founding, and reflect the views of the framers who 
aimed to both check the power of the State and “vest substantial 
adjudicatory power in the people.”36 Modern adversarial theory and 
practice consolidated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with 
the adoption of evidentiary rules and “highly structured forensic 
procedure[s]” that governed the manner in which parties could 
present their cases orally in court.37 Formal procedure made it possible 
to cabin the role of the judge and construct the proper barrier between 
the decision-maker and the parties.38 
Scholars have depicted adversary procedure as the “hallmark of 
American adjudication,” with “[t]he virtues . . . so deeply engrained 
in the American legal psyche that most lawyers do not question it.”39 
Others have noted that the “adversarial ethic is a pervasive influence—
almost a religion unto itself—that permeates our legal system.”40 Some 
 
 33. See Fuller, supra note 31, at 44. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 403, 527 (1992) (quoting Lord Green as asserting that when a judge questions 
a witness, he “descends into the arena and is liable to have his vision clouded by the dust of 
the conflict”). 
 36. Resnik, supra note 5, at 381; see generally Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial 
Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1212–13 (2005). 
 37. LANDSMAN, READINGS, supra note 24, at 15–21. 
 38. Landsman, Brief Survey, supra note 26, at 734. 
 39. Sward, Values, supra note 22, at 301. 
 40. John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyering in a Hybrid Adversary System, 38 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 45, 61 (1997). 
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have even characterized American adjudication as an “extreme 
form[]” of adversary process.41 
There is no question that our cultural self-conception heavily 
favors the party contest and the silent, impartial judge.42 Often, the 
mere mention of the judge-controlled inquisitorial model is 
surrounded with an “aura of dread and mistrust.”43 David Sklansky has 
argued that adversary norms are so embedded in the American psyche 
that the Supreme Court regularly invokes “anti-inquisitorialism” to 
drive the development of constitutional doctrine.44 He cites to several 
recent cases in which the Court held that procedures reducing party 
control were so evidently un-American, no further explanation was 
needed to declare them invalid.45 
Amalia Kessler also describes courts’ reflexive aversion to 
inquisitorial elements in procedure.46 She points to a recent decision 
by the D.C. Circuit in which the appointment of a post-trial master 
was struck down on the basis that judicial investigation into the 
parties’ compliance with a court order “simply is not permissible under 
our adversarial system of justice . . . .”47  Although the adversary 
norms of party control and passive judging do not have direct 
constitutional lineage, courts typically grant them great deference in 
determining the proper division of labor and authority in American 
litigation.48 
 
 41. Van Kessel, supra note 35, at 407–08. 
 42. With a skeptic’s eye, Judge Marvin Frankel writes that “for most of us trained in 
American law, the superiority of the adversary process over any other is too plain to doubt or 
examine.” Frankel, supra note 24 at 1052. 
 43. Mirjan Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal 
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 557–58 (1973). 
 44. David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1668–
69 (2009). 
 45. Id. at 1636–37. Sklansky cites the cases of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004) (striking down use of out-of-court statements as a violation of the Confrontation 
Clause), Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (striking down mandatory sentencing that 
relies on judicial fact-finding), and Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006) 
(upholding procedural default rules), as examples of the Court developing criminal procedure 
doctrine on the basis of procedural conformity with pure adversary norms, rather than offering 
well-reasoned justifications for its holdings). 
 46. Kessler, supra note 36, at 1195 n.66, 1258. 
 47. Id. at 1182–83 (quoting Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). 
 48. Most adversary norms are not enshrined in the Constitution, although some are. 
These include the Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury trial and the Sixth Amendment’s right 
to confront adverse witnesses in criminal cases. 
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Though adversary procedure retains its potency in most aspects of 
American adjudication, complex litigation has transformed the 
traditional passive judging model.49 In recent decades, the role of the 
judge has evolved to meet the demands of newer forms of litigation, 
particularly those arising out of the increased use of the class action 
lawsuit and the expansion of constitutional rights in the 1960s 
and 1970s.50 
In one embodiment of this evolution, active judicial management 
of pre-trial proceedings has become the norm in big litigation.51 
Commentators have pointed to the various ways that multiple parties, 
mountains of discovery, and complicated choice of law and venue 
questions may combine to thrust the judge “into the trenches” of the 
case even before formal adjudication begins.52 For instance, a judge 
may be called upon to decide whether potential class members have 
experienced common injuries, or to determine whether an 
interrogatory properly requests a relevant document. In both 
instances, judicial intervention in the case occurs well before trial and 
creates an opportunity for the judge to gain exposure to the facts and 
issues in the case, or even to actively shape the trajectory of 
the litigation. 
Provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Civil 
Justice Reform Act have enshrined an active pre-trial role for judges.53 
 
 49. See Chayes, Role supra note 6, at 1283–84, 1298; Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort 
Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 GEO. L.J. 1983, 1985 (1999); Resnik, supra note 5 at 
376–78; William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 
372 (2001). 
 50. See Abram Chayes, Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
4, 6 (1982). 
 51. See Resnik, supra note 5, at 378. Judith Resnik first identified this trend and coined 
the term “managerial judges” to describe active judicial involvement in pre-trial affairs. See also 
Tobias Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1027, 
1029–30 (2013). 
 52. Resnik, supra note 5, at 391. 
  53. The Civil Justice Reform Act urges judges to communicate regularly with attorneys 
during pre-trial proceedings, engage in early settlement and case management conferences, and 
to pursue early involvement with litigation events. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 (2012). The Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure likewise empower judges to make use of pre-trial conferences, to 
facilitate settlement, and to establish “early and continuing control” over a case. See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 16. 
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These provisions create wide latitude for the judge to preside over 
settlement talks, issue scheduling orders, and require parties to attend 
case management conferences.54 Arthur Miller refers to pre-trial 
judicial management as a “significant modification, and perhaps an 
unquantifiable debilitation, of the historic bilateral adversary 
system.”55 Nonetheless, these pre-trial judicial management devices 
are now seen as indispensable to the efficient handling of large-
scale disputes.56 
In a similar vein, an active post-trial role for judges has become 
typical in major public law cases.57 Judges now frequently investigate 
and monitor the enforcement of remedies, particularly where relief 
involves forward-looking reform of large public institutions.58 For 
instance, take the police misconduct case of Allen v. City of Oakland, 
in which well over 100 plaintiffs alleged multiple counts of excessive 
force.59 The resulting consent decree awarded not only damages to the 
aggrieved plaintiffs but also required the police department to 
implement several institutional reforms.60 In keeping with what has 
become regular practice in such cases, the judge appointed a special 
master to investigate police compliance with the required institutional 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleadings, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the 
Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 296–
97 (2013). 
 56. See Steven Baicker-McKee, Reconceptualizing Managerial Judges, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 
353 (2015) (recommending that judicial management of pre-trial litigation activities be 
required, rather than simply encouraged). 
 57. See Chayes, Role, supra note 6, at 1298, 1301; MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. 
RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED 
AMERICA’S PRISONS 12–13 (1998); Kessler, supra note 36, at 1186; Ellen E. Sward, A History 
of the Civil Trial in the United States, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 347, 399–400 (2003) [hereinafter 
Sward, History]; David Zaring, National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big Case and 
Institutional Reform, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1015, 1018–21 (2004); John Choon Yoo, Who 
Measures the Chancellor’s Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1121, 1137 (1996). 
 58. Kessler, supra note 36, at 1194; Zaring, supra note 57, at 1018–21. 
 59. Allen v. City of Oakland, No. C00-4599, 2012 WL 5949619 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 28, 2012). 
 60. The consent decree required the implementation of more than fifty reforms, including 
timely internal investigations of police misconduct, integrity testing for officers who are the 
subject of repeated complaints, sanctions for officers who do not relay citizen complaints to the 
department, and adoption of a policy to accept anonymous citizen complaints. Order, Allen v. 
City of Oakland, No. C00-4599, 2012 WL 5949619 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2012). 
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reforms.61 The court has retained jurisdiction over the Allen case for 
more than twelve years, and the judge will likely exercise active control 
over the affairs of the Oakland Police Department into the foreseeable 
future.62 This sort of post-trial management is de rigueur in civil rights 
cases, as implementation of even agreed-upon injunctive relief can 
prove elusive. Although some scholars contend that institutional 
reform litigation is on the wane,63 it “remains a vibrant and active part 
of the law, governing a variety of different types of local institutions.”64 
Last, scholars have observed that, in important appellate matters, 
judges have a semi-regular habit of raising a legal issue or fact the 
parties omitted.65 These practices—sua sponte judicial issue creation 
and reliance on facts untested through the adversary process—are not 
necessarily new modes of judicial activism, but they serve as equally 
notable departures from adversary norms. Judges are most likely to 
engage in these departures when the resulting decision will issue 
“broad guidelines for future conduct.”66 Amanda Frost provides an 
example of judicial issue creation in the case of Dickerson v. United 
 
 61. For the reports prepared by the independent monitor regarding the Oakland Police 
Department’s compliance with the consent decree, see List of reports for Allen v. City of 
Oakland, Case No. C00-4599, N.D. CALI., http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/pages/964, (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2016). 
 62. Id. 
 63. In particular, public law cases aimed at prison reform and school desegregation have 
been stymied by Congressional and Supreme Court activity limiting available remedies. See 
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1)(A) (2012) (permitting prisons to seek 
termination of injunctive relief after a short period of judicial monitoring); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 
U.S. 467, 490, 492 (1992) (granting lower courts discretion to return a school to local control 
where the school district has substantially complied with a desegregation order). 
 64. Zaring, supra note 57, at 1021 (noting that “vast numbers of government institutions 
throughout the country continue to be subject to the supervision of district courts”). 
 65. Frost, supra note 8, at 455, 461–62 (addressing the courts’ habit of raising legal 
issues); Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 
DUKE L.J. 1, 27 (2011) (discussing the courts’ propensity for considering facts not brought 
forward by the parties); Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive 
Litigants of an Opportunity to Be Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1253, 1255 (2002) [hereinafter 
Barry Miller, Sua Sponte] (referring to the regularity with which courts raise issues the parties 
have not presented and argued). 
 66. Barry Miller, Sua Sponte, supra note 65, at 1273; see also Frost, supra note 8, at 509 
(noting that judicial issue creation is necessary when a court must reframe an issue because a 
party has misrepresented the law “either intentionally or by mistake”). 
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States.67 In Dickerson, a criminal confession case, both the defendant 
and the government framed their arguments to the Fourth Circuit 
around a Miranda issue: the defendant sought to suppress his 
confession on the basis that he was never read his Miranda rights, 
while the government asserted that the police had substantially 
satisfied their constitutional obligations.68 Despite the parties’ 
arguments, the Fourth Circuit disregarded the Miranda issue and sua 
sponte invoked a controversial federal statute to decide the case.69 
Neither party had briefed or raised the statutory issue, but the court 
found it dispositive.70 
As an example of extra-record fact-finding, Brianne Gorod points 
to Citizens United v. FEC.71 In that case, the Supreme Court reached 
beyond the facts brought forward by the parties to support a key aspect 
of its ruling. Specifically, the Court relied on an amicus brief and an 
IRS bulletin to find that the creation of a political action committee 
was “burdensome,” and therefore, did not constitute an alternative 
mechanism through which corporations could speak.72 The parties did 
not introduce these facts into the record, nor did the Court ask the 
parties to test them through the adversary process before granting 
them substantial weight.73 In other high-profile cases, the Court has 
followed a similar process, often obtaining extra-record empirical 
evidence to inform its decisions, even where those facts are the subject 
of debate and discovered outside any formal filing in the case.74 
Judicial issue creation and fact-finding fall outside traditional adversary 
norms, but have been defended as necessary departures for courts that 
 
 67. Frost, supra note 8, at 468–96; see United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th 
Cir. 1999). 
 68. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 673–76. 
 69. Id. at 692. 
 70. Id. at 686; see also Sarah M. R. Cravens, Involved Appellate Judging, 88 MARQ. L. 
REV. 251 (2004); Barry Miller, Sua Sponte, supra note 65, at 1255 (listing several famous 
examples of Supreme Court cases in which the Justices raised and decided a new legal issue). 
 71. Gorod, supra note 65, at 28–29. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Gorod also discusses the Prop 8 case, in which the Ninth Circuit looked outside the 
record for information on how children of same-sex parents fare. Id. at 40–41. 
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engage in law development and are expected to produce accurate, fully 
informed decisions with high precedential value.75 
C. Presumptions 
Despite well-recognized departures from adversary procedure, the 
consensus is that our system “generally lives up to [the] adversarial 
ideal”76 and is “more adversarial than most.”77 Active judging has been 
cast as a “big case” phenomenon, rather than an evolution of adversary 
norms throughout the entire civil justice system.78 As the trend of 
managerial judging mushroomed in the 1980s, John Langbein was 
quick to point out that the importance of the development should 
“not be overstated,” as “many American courtrooms” were left 
“untouched” by increasing judicial control.79 More recently, Ellen 
Sward has argued that departures from adversary procedure remain 
limited to certain contexts.80 She notes that “[c]omplex litigation, 
involving multiple parties or difficult scientific or social issues, is the 
area where the adversary system has undergone the most significant 
modification.”81 Jay Tidmarsh has likewise suggested that variations 
 
 75. Judicial issue creation and fact-finding are particularly prevalent in the highest levels 
of the judicial system. See Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-And-Comment 
Judicial Decisionmaking, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965, 972 (2009) (noting that courts regularly 
resolve cases “by employing legal reasoning and citing legal authorities not suggested by the 
parties” and discussing a study of 112 cases decided by a state supreme court in a single year 
which found that about half of all legal authorities cited by the court were not mentioned by 
counsel in briefs or arguments). 
 76. Gorod, supra note 65, at 3. 
 77. Resnik, supra note 5, at 382. 
 78. See LANDSMAN, READINGS, supra note 24, at 30 (discussing the evolution of judicial 
passivity in complex litigation); see also Erichson, supra note 49, at 1985; Gorod, supra note 65, 
at 26–27; Kessler, supra note 36 at 1186; Rubenstein, supra note 49, at 371–72; Sward, Values 
supra note 22, at 327, 346–51. Judith Resnik suggests that the managerial judge also appears in 
regular litigation; however, she cites a large products liability case as regular despite its potential 
to affect thousands of consumers and the financial bottom line of multinational corporations.  
Resnik, supra note 5, at 386–91. This Article refers to a different kind of “regular” case—one 
that involves two parties and very little money, and only affects the individuals that are party to 
the suit. It is difficult to find reference to a managerial or active judge that emerges within such 
a case. 
 79. John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 
823, 858, 860 (1985). 
 80. Sward, Values, supra note 23, at 326. 
 81. Id. 
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from adversarial process are most prominent in a “set of cases,” 
principally those that can be defined as “polycentric,” “sprawling,” 
and “complex.”82 Indeed, active judging is often defended precisely 
because supporters view it as a model that is selectively used, born of 
necessity, and relied upon only in significant cases affecting large 
classes of future litigants.83 
By contrast, the typical presumption is that the adversary paradigm 
continues to thrive in ordinary, two-party cases where the judge “is 
focused on dispute resolution”84 and “applies settled law.”85 The 
courts themselves relegate discussions of adversary evolution to the 
realm of complex litigation. The major source of official guidance on 
active judging, the Manual for Complex Litigation, developed by the 
Federal Judicial Center and now in its fourth incarnation, identifies its 
goal as addressing “the trial judge’s heightened role” in big, multi-
party federal cases affecting such areas as mass torts, antitrust, 
securities, and patent law.86 It is regularly updated to take into account 
the ever-increasing complexity of litigation and to set forth best 
practices for the judge to “exercise extensive supervision and control” 
over pre-trial, trial, and post-trial aspects of large-scale cases.87 No 
similar manual discusses modification of the judicial role in two-party 
settings. In fact, the Manual itself indicates that state courts might find 
its contents useful primarily in handling cases that converge with a 
federal matter.88 
At a theoretical level, there is every reason to expect that adversary 
norms would perform well in the “small case” civil justice system. 
Many two-party cases tend to be relatively simple, implicating small 
amounts of money or raising disputes with discrete issues that affect 
 
 82. Jay Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 563–65 
(2006). Other commentators have also taken the position that non-adversarial elements most 
commonly infuse “high stakes cases that [a]re especially complex.” See Kessler, supra note 36, at 
1196–97; see also Erichson, supra note 49, at 1988 (referring to changes in the adversarial model 
in mass tort cases due to the complexity of these matters); Rubenstein, supra note 49, at 371–
73 (discussing the private law class action as joining other complex private and public law 
disputes as cases in which an active judge is necessary). 
 83. Frost, supra note 8, at 509–10; Barry Miller, Sua Sponte, supra note 65, at 1273. 
 84. Frost, supra note 8, at 495. 
 85. Gorod, supra note 65, at 10. 
 86. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) 1 (2004) [hereinafter MANUAL]. 
 87. See id. § 10.1. 
 88. See id. at 1. 
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only the parties to the litigation. A child support case, for example, 
involves basic fact-finding around the parents’ income and the 
financial needs of the child, all in accordance with well-established 
guidelines.89 A landlord-tenant case revolves, on average, around a 
single month of missed rent payment, often totaling less than $1000.90 
Neither of these case types—nor most others in the civil justice 
system—requires a judge to manage novel issues, numerous parties, 
complex discovery, expert testimony, or wide-ranging remedies. 
Furthermore, these cases do not invoke the need for the issuance of 
broad principles that will bind large categories of non-parties well into 
the future; judges function squarely in their dispute resolution roles.91 
As such, it appears perfectly feasible to rely on the parties to advance 
their bread-and-butter cases with minimal judicial intervention—or so 
the thinking goes. 
Moreover, the relatively unchanging nature of small cases over the 
course of American history also provides reason to think that adversary 
norms would remain relevant in this arena. The adversary system 
emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a method of 
adjudicating disputes involving two parties, and most of the matters 
in today’s trial courts still fit that general mold.92 Whereas the large-
scale private or public law case is a recent, and dramatic, development 
requiring new modes of adjudication, ordinary, two-party matters 
have undergone no similar transformation.93 Perhaps scholars and 
 
 89. CARMEN SOLOMON-FEARS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22380, CHILD SUPPORT 
ENFORCEMENT: PROGRAM BASICS 4 (2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
RS22380.pdf. For an example of a state statute setting forth child support guidelines, see 1987 
Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 419–36 (West). 
 90. See Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor 
Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 551, 555 n.61 (1992) (reporting that 
seventy-eight percent of eviction cases in Baltimore revolved around missed rent payment of one 
month). The fair market rent in Baltimore for FY2015 was $985. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & 
URBAN DEV., FINAL FY 2015 FAIR MARKET RENT DOCUMENTATION SYSTEM, 
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/fmr/fmrs/docsys.html?data=fmr15. 
 91. Frost, supra note 8, at 494–95; Gorod supra note 65, at 10. 
 92. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 691–92, 751–54 
(2009) (providing depictions of early adversary trials in the criminal context); see also Mark H. 
Lazeron, In the Halls of Justice the Only Justice is in the Halls, in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL 
JUSTICE 119, 123 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982) (noting that, in New York, summary proceedings 
have existed in landlord-tenant cases since 1820). 
 93. Sward, History, supra note 57, at 396, 406 (asserting that trials in 1836 looked quite 
similar to trials today); see also Lawrence M. Friedman & Robert V. Percival, A Tale of Two 
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courts have seen no reason to re-assess the viability of adversary norms 
in ordinary litigation, as this is the very setting in which they were 
initially designed to operate. 
The presumption that adversary norms hold constant in regular, 
two-party litigation is a presumption that nearly ninety-nine percent 
of civil cases operate in this tradition.94 However, as Part III 
demonstrates, a quick detour to the state courts reveals that this 
presumption fails to account for a major and recent upheaval in the 
civil justice system: the rise of an unrepresented majority. 
III. ADVERSARY NORMS AND THE UNREPRESENTED MAJORITY 
The state courts are flooded with cases related to consumer debt, 
divorce, child custody and support, paternity, wage and hour, 
landlord-tenant, abuse and neglect, probate, and domestic violence.95 
In most jurisdictions, commercial contract disputes and tort matters 
occupy a minority, but still significant, portion of the civil dockets as 
well.96 It is in this context—and in these matters—that the norms of 
party control and passive judging are still expected to define the 
contours of litigation.97 
Increasingly, however, a great majority of litigants in the state 
courts are unrepresented by counsel.98 In some case types, such as 
 
Courts: Litigation in Alameda and San Benito Counties, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 267, 280–83 
(1975) (reporting that a similar mix of property, contract, family law, and tort cases occupied 
the courts both in 1890 and in 1970, although the frequency of each case type has 
changed significantly). 
 94. In 2013, there were 22.1 million civil cases filed in the state courts and 271,950 civil 
cases filed in the federal courts, meaning the adversary presumption applies to nearly ninety-nine 
percent of cases. See EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, supra note 12, at 7; Federal 
Judicial Caseload Statistics 2013, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports
/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2013. 
 95. See Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47 CONN. 
L. REV. 741, 743 (2015). 
 96. EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, supra note 12, at 1, 11 (reporting that 
six percent of matters in the state courts are tort cases); STATE OF CONN. JUDICIAL BRANCH, 
(reporting that, in Connecticut, in 2013, 4.4 percent of new civil cases were non-collection 
contracts cases). 
 97. Certainly, there are two-party cases in the federal courts as well. However, the vast 
majority of two-party cases, and the largest problems with lack of representation, occur in the 
state courts. 
 98. Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOYOLA. L. REV. 869, 
869–70, (2009). This figure is also on the rise in the federal courts. See Victor D. Quintanilla, 
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family law, a high proportion of cases involve two 
unrepresentedparties.99 In other matters, such as consumer debt, one 
party (the debtor) is almost certain to lack attorney representation, 
while the other party (the creditor) is very likely to be represented. For 
instance, The Task Force to Expand Legal Services in New York 
reported in 2011 that ninety-nine percent of borrowers in “hundreds 
of thousands” of consumer credit cases are unrepresented.100 Other 
representative statistics include a seventy-five percent pro se rate for 
tenants in Maine;101 a ninety-four percent incidence of unrepresented 
parties in domestic violence cases in Arkansas;102 and an eighty percent 
rate of pro se litigants in family law cases in one Wisconsin County.103 
In New Hampshire, eighty-five percent of all civil cases in the district 
courts involve an unrepresented party.104 Perhaps the only two-party 
case types, in which unrepresented parties are not now the dominant 
norm, are tort and commercial contract matters,105 which, together, 
typically comprise about ten percent of a court’s docket.106 
 
et al., The Signaling Effect of Pro Se Status, 8 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY (forthcoming 2016) (on file 
with author). 
 99. BOSTON BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS, REPORT ON PRO 
SE LITIGATION 1, 5, https://www.bostonbar.org/prs/reports/unrepresented0898.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2016). 
 100. JONATHAN LIPPMAN, THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 2011: PURSUING JUSTICE 1, 4 
(2011), http://www.nycourts.gov/admin/stateofjudiciary/SOJ-2011.pdf. 
 101. See John C. Sheldon, Thinking Outside of the Box About Pro Se Litigation, 23 ME. 
BAR J. 90, 91 (2008). 
 102. JOHN M. GREACEN, SERVICES FOR SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN ARKANSAS: A 
REPORT TO THE ARKANSAS ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMMISSION 2, 10 (2013), 
http://www.arkansasjustice.org/sites/default/files/file%20attachments/Arkansas%20Final%2
0Report%207-26-13.pdf (basing the statewide statistics on a survey of three counties). 
 103. Marsha M. Mansfield, Litigants Without Lawyers: Measuring Success in Family Court, 
67 HASTINGS L.J. 1389, 1401 (2016) (stating that in Dane County, Wisconsin 1664 out of 
2084 new family law cases were filed by pro se parties). 
 104. N.H. SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON SELF-REPRESENTATION, CHALLENGE TO 
JUSTICE: A REPORT ON SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN NEW HAMPSHIRE COURTS 1, 2 
(2004), http://www.courts.state.nh.us/ supreme/docs/prosereport.pdf. 
 105. For instance, in Washington state, the pro se rate in tort and commercial cases 
remained flat at two to three percent over a period of six years. JUDICIAL SERVS. DIV. ADMIN. 
OFFICE OF THE COURTS, AN ANALYSIS OF PRO SE LITIGANTS IN WASHINGTON STATE 1995–
2000 1, 3 (2001), https://www.courts.wa.gov/wsccr/docs/Final%20Report_Pro_Se_
11_01.pdf (extrapolating from data available from ten counties). 
 106. See note 96 and accompanying text. 
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The Achilles heel of adversary theory, as it applies to ordinary 
cases, is that litigants must have skill and resources—and be equally 
matched in those departments—in order for the party-controlled 
contest to achieve fair results.107 For this reason, it is typically assumed 
that a party advancing a matter within the adversary system will need 
to rely on an attorney to pilot a course through intricate legal 
questions and mechanisms.108 Some have noted that the unequal 
capabilities of two attorneys may undermine fairness in ordinary 
litigation, as the more skillful attorney might be able to achieve 
superior results on grounds unrelated to the merits of the case.109 In 
today’s climate, however, most parties in the civil courts are 
unrepresented entirely, and yet the impact of mass-scale lack of 
representation on adversary procedure has been almost 
completely overlooked. 
The unrepresented majority in the civil justice system has ruptured 
adversary norms in a series of chain reactions, which I will set forth. 
To bring or defend a case, the norm of party control requires that the 
litigant have the requisite knowledge to articulate legal theories, 
identify and admit key evidence, and make proper requests for relief. 
However, unrepresented parties often do not understand which issues 
are important to raise, and cannot, on their own, get all relevant facts 
and requests before the court.110 In turn, a passive judge, who relies 
on the parties to perform the basic tasks of litigation, is often unable 
to arrive at a reasonably accurate determination of the facts and issues 
in the case. When unrepresented parties are unable to execute their 
case duties effectively, the passive norm no longer holds legitimacy as 
a pathway to a fair, merits-based result.111 
 
 107. LANDSMAN, READINGS, supra note 24, at 4. 
 108. Id.; Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1285 (1975); 
Nancy Leong, Gideon’s Law-Protective Function, 122 YALE L. J. 2460, 2469 (2013). 
 109. LANDSMAN, READINGS, supra note 24, at 4. 
 110. See Steinberg, supra note 95, at 801; Super, supra note 9, at 407; PUB. JUSTICE CTR., 
JUSTICE DIVERTED: HOW RENTERS ARE PROCESSED IN THE BALTIMORE CITY RENT COURT 1, 
20, 33 (2015), http://www.publicjustice.org/uploads/file/pdf/JUSTICE_DIVERTED_PJC
_DEC15.pdf. 
 111. Some have argued that a judge within the adversary system has only a “limited duty” 
to pursue the truth or “do justice,” as the appearance of judicial impartiality is far more 
important. Van Kessel, supra note 35, at 527. While this may be true in individual cases, a justice 
system cannot be considered sound or valid if, as a whole, it fails to produce accurate results in 
most cases. Therefore, it is at least an implied goal of adversary process, and certainly an explicit 
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The case of Lombardi v. Citizens National Trust & Savings Bank 
illustrates the profound effects of pro se litigation on the passive 
judicial norm.112 Mr. Lombardi, an unrepresented party, brought an 
action against the executor of an estate to recover on a rejected claim. 
At trial, Mr. Lombardi produced a letter purportedly signed by the 
decedent in which she acknowledged a debt to Mr. Lombardi. 
Opposing counsel objected to admission of the letter into evidence for 
failure to lay the proper foundation. Mr. Lombardi attempted to 
introduce a second letter from a witness attesting to the authenticity 
of decedent’s signature. The second letter was excluded as hearsay. 
Finally, Mr. Lombardi appealed to the court for assistance in 
establishing the authenticity of his proposed exhibit. He said to the 
judge, “I don’t know what to do.”113 The judge responded, “You will 
have to proceed or not proceed, that is all. I cannot help you.”114 
Following this exchange, Mr. Lombardi rested and his opponent 
moved successfully for dismissal of the suit.115 
These dynamics, in which the unrepresented party lacks the 
technical and substantive skill to fulfill the norm of party control and 
yet the judge remains passive, destabilize a fair adjudicatory process. 
Mr. Lombardi was shut out of his own case, even though he had in 
his possession a potentially determinative document. He appealed to 
the judge for assistance in overcoming the objections of his skilled 
opponent, but was greeted with stony silence. Ultimately, 
implementation of adversary procedure in Mr. Lombardi’s case left the 
judge unable to perform his key fact-finding role, as only one party’s 
evidence made it into the record. 
Not every case is as stark as Lombardi, and yet even where the 
judge is more permissive and the unrepresented party has some ability 
to trudge through case presentation, the passive norm remains equally 
 
goal of many judges, that fair outcomes are reached. See Frankel, supra note 24, at 1033 (noting 
that the “paramount objective” of a trial is “the truth”). 
 112. See Lombardi v. Citizens Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Bank of L.A., 289 P.2d 823 (Cal. 
App. 1955). 
 113. Id. at 824. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. Lombardi is an early case but represents the continued approach of many courts 
today, even though the pro se rate has increased exponentially. Despite this being an old case, I 
chose to include it as an example because the appellate decision includes an unusual amount of 
dialogue from the trial court that presents a clear picture of the types of interactions judges often 
have with unrepresented parties today. 
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problematic. Consider this hypothetical case example, drawn from 
practice, which brings a more nuanced adversary breakdown into 
sharper focus: 
Anita, a long-term renter in a low-income housing complex, files 
suit against her landlord for breach of the implied warranty of 
habitability. She obtains a building inspector’s report, which details 
multiple violations of the housing code, and a month prior to filing 
her lawsuit, sends it to her landlord along with her rent check. Even 
though the report documents bedbug and rodent infestation, broken 
locks and windows, and a leaky bathtub that has caused mildew to 
spread throughout the apartment, the landlord does not acknowledge 
receiving the report and makes no repairs. 
At the evidentiary hearing in her case, Anita appears without 
counsel. She has a full-time job as a cashier at a local drugstore but, at 
minimum wage, she makes less than $16,000 a year and cannot afford 
an attorney. The judge presiding over the matter asks Anita if she 
would like contact information for an attorney; he offers to continue 
the case for a month to allow her time to seek representation. Anita 
declines, as the week prior she had taken off a day from work to visit 
a Legal Aid office, and was told the wait to see an attorney would be 
more than six months.116 The judge allows Anita to testify in narrative 
form, but advises that he cannot assist her in presenting her case. Anita 
speaks to the substandard conditions in her unit, her frustration at her 
landlord’s recalcitrance in responding, and the asthma attacks suffered 
by her son, which his doctors believe are exacerbated by the mildew 
and rodents. She also swerves off on a lengthy tangent, speaking at 
some length about a dispute she had with her landlord a year ago 
regarding a guest staying in her unit—and the judge allows her to air 
her unrelated grievance. 
Anita neglects to mention that she sent her landlord a copy of the 
building inspection report more than a month ago; she does not know 
that “notice” of the conditions is a required legal element in her 
habitability case. The judge does not ask her to elaborate on this issue, 
or even flag it as relevant. When Anita attempts to introduce the 
inspector’s report into evidence, the landlord’s attorney objects on the 
 
 116. Anita’s experience is not uncommon in this regard.  There is only one federally funded 
lawyer available for every 6,415 eligible low-income individuals. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., 
DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS 
OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 1 (2009), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba
/migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/JusticeGaInAmerica2009.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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basis that she has failed to authenticate it. The judge sustains the 
objection and asks Anita if she would like to try again. He explains 
that she would need to provide information on the report’s author, 
when it was produced, and its chain of custody. Flustered, Anita 
moves on. 
At the conclusion of the case, Anita tells the judge she just wants 
the landlord to make repairs. She is unaware that, in her jurisdiction, 
damages are the only prescribed remedy in habitability matters—
injunctive relief is not available. While Anita has experienced financial 
loss, she does not produce a medical report documenting a connection 
between the housing conditions and her son’s health issues, nor does 
she bring a record of medical bills. The judge asks Anita if there is 
anything else she would like to add, and she shakes her head. The 
judge utters “judgment for landlord” into the record and tells Anita 
that she failed to establish the statutory element of “notice,” and also 
failed to bring forward sufficient evidence of both the violations and 
her financial losses. 
Anita’s case is illustrative of many cases on a modern-day civil 
docket, and it underscores the declining feasibility of adversary norms 
to adjudicate cases fairly in a majority pro se court. Even in a 
substantively simple proceeding, like a habitability matter—in which a 
few statutory elements and a handful of documents govern the case—
Anita could not propel critical evidence into the judge’s line of sight 
or connect the dots between her injury and an obtainable form of 
relief. In Anita’s example, the judge was flexible and patient, and yet 
the overriding norm of party control worked at odds with an accurate 
case result. Anita had an opportunity to share her narrative, but in the 
process, committed factual, legal and procedural errors that doomed 
her case, despite its potential merit. She failed to provide testimony on 
a legal element she had satisfied, was unable to comply with procedural 
rules, failed to seek admission of readily available medical reports and 
bills, and did not request a legally cognizable remedy. Indeed, the 
judge in Anita’s case might be viewed as a high-level procedural 
gatekeeper, rather than a skilled fact-finder, as he placed greater 
emphasis on enforcing the rules than he did on bringing forward facts 
and evidence that were readily available. 
Anita and Lombardi are not outlier examples, but two iterations 
of a much larger phenomenon. Researchers have noted that 
unrepresented parties routinely struggle to develop their cases. The 
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National Center for State Courts has compiled a list of 140 discrete 
barriers that pro se parties must overcome to successfully litigate a case 
to completion.117 These include using proper legal language in a 
pleading, recalling accurate and specific details about a past event, 
producing “legitimate” documents as evidence, comprehending the 
ramifications of multiple pending cases, and taking action to enforce a 
judgment.118 Through in-court observations, researchers have 
concluded that unrepresented parties perform few of these 
tasks well.119 
Trial judges who preside over majority pro se dockets often 
recount the difficulties faced by litigants in their courtrooms. In 
significant studies conducted under the auspices of the American Bar 
Association,120 the American Judicature Society,121 and the State 
Justice Institute122 up to ninety percent of judges indicate that 
unrepresented parties are likely to commit errors in carrying out the 
major tasks expected of them within the adversary system—namely, 
production of evidence, compliance with procedural rules, and 
examination of witnesses. Judges are also candid in expressing the 
concern that, as a result of substantive or procedural mistakes, the 
unrepresented are often barred from legal redress.123 
 
 117. See Ronald W. Staudt & Paula L. Hannaford, Access to Justice for the Self-Represented 
Litigant: An Interdisciplinary Investigation by Designers and Lawyers, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
1017, 1028 (2002). 
 118. See id. at 1035–47. 
 119. See id; see also Steinberg, supra note 95, at 754–59 (summarizing the available research 
on outcomes and experiences for pro se litigants). 
 120. LINDA KLEIN, ABA COALITION FOR JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE SURVEY OF JUDGES 
ON THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN ON REPRESENTATION IN THE COURTS 2 
(2010), http://www.abajournal.com/files/Coalition_for_Justice_Report_on_Survey.pdf. 
 121. Ryan C. Munden, Access to Justice: Pro Se Litigation in Indiana, AM. JUDICATURE 
SOC’Y, Fall 2005. 
 122. Jona Goldschmidt et al., Meeting the Challenge of Pro Se Litigation: A Report and 
Guidebook for Judges and Managers, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 3, 9 (1998), cdm16501. 
contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/accessfair/id/106. 
 123. See Beverly W. Snukals & Glen H. Sturtevant, Jr., Pro Se Litigation: Best Practices from 
a Judge’s Perspective, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 93, 95 (2007) (stating that pro se parties often fail to 
obtain remedies because “ . . . they neglect to file a bill of complaint within the applicable statute 
of limitation, suffer a default judgment for failing to file their answer within the applicable 
statutory deadline, or have their case dismissed on a demurrer for failing to adequately plead 
their cause of action.”); see also Dorothy J. Wilson & Miriam B. Hutchins, Practical Advice From 
the Trenches: Best Techniques for Handling Unrepresented Litigants, 51 CT. REV. 54, 57 (2015) 
(advising that procedural and technical deficiencies in a pro se filing can lead to legally inaccurate 
results, as the pleadings “ . . . may contain rambling narratives about any number of matters . . . 
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Enhancements to the judicial role, such as those present in 
complex litigation, have been regarded as irrelevant or inappropriate 
in low-level state court cases where features such as multiple parties, 
voluminous discovery, expert testimony, and precedential questions of 
law are absent. And yet, due to the rise of an unrepresented majority, 
adversary norms are now failing in the very context where they are 
expected to conform to traditional notions. Rather than grapple with 
this seismic shift in the viability of American procedure, however, 
courts and ethics boards have buried it from public view. Their 
approach to addressing the colliding forces of pro se litigation and 
passive judging are taken up in the next part. 
IV. COURTS, ETHICS, AND THE PASSIVE NORM 
In contrast to complex litigation, where a plethora of manuals and 
rules now detail best practices for active judging, the various bodies 
that regulate judicial conduct have not articulated a need for adversary 
evolution in the two-party civil justice system. Very few courts have 
taken up any discussion of the judicial role in two-party cases involving 
the unrepresented, and those that have often dispense contradictory 
guidance, or simply reiterate the maxim that judges must remain 
passive, regardless of whether such conduct leads to an unfair 
outcome.124 New ethical guidelines125 purport to address the dilemma 
by allowing judges to extend basic accommodations to the 
unrepresented, but as this Part will show, the contemplated 
accommodations focus on explanation, referrals, and judicial 
demeanor, none of which solve the core issue: that pro se parties 
cannot effectively develop or present legal theories or facts. In effect, 
existing doctrine perpetuates the fiction that, with only superficial 
modifications, adversary procedure remains a largely operational 
framework for adjudicating pro se cases. 
 
[and] may consist of a hodgepodge of documents and information that expresses the litigant’s 
dissatisfaction . . . but is only loosely woven together”). 
 124. See infra Section IV.A. 
 125. See infra note 148 and accompanying text. 
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A. Sparse, Unhelpful and Contradictory Court Decisions 
Despite the frequency with which trial judges must contend with 
unrepresented parties, appellate courts have paid very little attention 
to the proper role of the judge in such proceedings. In fact, only a few 
dozen opinions address the intersection of pro se litigation and 
adversary norms.126 Moreover, the courts’ guidance is often unhelpful 
or contradictory. Many decisions cleave to the passive norm and reject 
the premise that pro se status might be a reason to re-think the judicial 
role. Other courts appear more attuned to the failures of adversary 
process, but provide conflicting directives on whether judges should 
pursue fairness or proper procedure. 
The case of Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald provides an example of the 
courts’ emphasis on the norm of party control.127 In that case, an 
unrepresented wife claimed a non-marital interest in the couple’s real 
property, but neglected to provide testimony to support the $10,000 
amount she claimed in her pleading to have contributed toward the 
property.128 The Minnesota Court of Appeals dismissed her plea to 
supplement the factual record, holding that pro se parties are “ . . . 
held to the same standards as attorneys and must comply with court 
rules . . . .” in putting on their cases.129 In a second example, Washura 
County v. Graf, a tax foreclosure case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
was critical of the lower court for sua sponte raising a dispositive legal 
issue that the pro se party herself had failed to put forward.130 The 
court emphasized that a trial judge has no duty to “ . . . walk pro se 
litigants through the procedural requirements or to point them to the 
proper substantive law.”131 Numerous other courts have followed suit, 
upholding basic adversarial principles while ignoring the ramifications 
 
 126. See Cynthia Gray, Reaching Out Or Overreaching: Judicial Ethics and Self-Represented 
Litigants, 27 NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 97 (2007) [hereinafter Gray, Reaching Out] 
for comprehensive treatment of appellate cases touching on the role of the judge in handling 
matters involving unrepresented parties. It may well be that very little case law touches on the 
pro se issue because so few lawyers are available to appeal such cases. 
 127. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119–20 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Waushara Cty. v. Graf, 480 N.W.2d 16, 19–20 (Wis. 1992). 
 131. Id. at 20. 
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of obvious deficiencies in pro se case presentation.132 Courts that hew 
to orthodox notions of adversary procedure effectively advise judges 
that Lombardi represents the proper approach for resolving millions 
of divorce, eviction, and consumer disputes: the party that can 
navigate procedure wins the contest, and no recalibration of the 
judicial role should be undertaken to protect litigants who cannot 
prevail on those terms. 
Some jurisdictions cling so stubbornly to the passive norm that 
judges have been discouraged from providing even the most basic 
information to an unrepresented party, lest they be seen as an advocate 
for one side. In one prominent example, a debate played out in several 
circuits over the propriety of having judges advise unrepresented 
parties of the duty to submit counter-affidavits in opposition to a 
motion for summary judgment.133 To be clear, the controversy did not 
contemplate judicial assistance in crafting the counter-affidavits; it 
simply centered around whether a judge should inform pro se parties 
that a publicly available rule of civil procedure requires submission of 
a particular form of evidence—written affidavits—in order to survive a 
motion for summary judgment.134 At least three circuits concluded 
that judges were well within their proper role to refuse instruction on 
this procedural requirement.135 In taking this stance, the Ninth Circuit 
 
 132. See Bowman v. Pat’s Auto Parts, 504 So. 2d 736, 737 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987) (holding 
that “the rules of procedure . . . are no more forgiving to a pro se litigant than to one represented 
by counsel.”); Manka v. Martin, 614 P.2d 875, 880 (Colo. 1980) (“A litigant is permitted to 
present his own case, but, in doing, should be restricted to the same rules of . . . procedure as is 
required of those qualified to practice law before our courts . . . .” (quoting Knapp v. Fleming, 
258 P.2d 489, 489–490 (Colo. 1953)); Solimine v. Davidian, 661 N.E.2d 934, 934 (Mass. 
1996) (“The fact that Solimine is acting pro se is also of no significance because he is held to the 
same standards to which litigants with counsel are held.”); Bullard v. Morris, 547 So. 2d 789, 
790 (Miss. 1989); Newsome v. Farer, 708 P.2d 327, 331 (N.M. 1985) (“[A] pro se litigant 
must comply with the rules and orders of the court, enjoying no greater rights than those who 
employ counsel.”); Sunpower, Inc. v. Hawley, 296 N.W.2d 532, 533 (S.D. 1980) (“Defendant 
contends that this Court should set aside the default judgment because he was unfamiliar with 
the rules of pleading and trial practice. We do not agree.”). 
 133. See Jessica Case, Pro Se Litigants at the Summary Judgment Stage: Is Ignorance of the 
Law an Excuse?, 90 KY. L.J. 701, 703–04, 704 n.24 (2002). 
 134. See id. 
 135. See Beck v. Skon, 253 F.3d 330, 333 (8th Cir. 2001); Martin v. Harrison Cty. Jail, 
975 F.2d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1992); Brock v. Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339, 343 (6th Cir. 1988); 
see also Jona Goldschmidt, Autonomy and “Gray-Area” Pro Se Defendants: Ensuring Competence 
to Guarantee Freedom, 6 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 130, 144 n.97 (2011). 
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expressed concerns that a judge who offered information about a 
procedural issue would improperly inject himself into the case, 
“becoming a player in the adversary process rather than remaining its 
referee.”136 The potential for the judge to influence the outcome was 
viewed as a wholesale negative by the court rather than as a positive 
feature that could enhance the validity of the court’s role in 
fair adjudication.137 
Even the courts willing to recognize that the twin norms of party 
control and passive judging do not co-exist comfortably in cases 
involving the unrepresented typically offer judges no comprehensible 
instruction on how they might wrestle with the pro se dilemma. In the 
case of Austin v. Ellis, for example, the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court highlighted the “direct conflict” that results in a pro se case 
when a judge’s “essential function to serve as an impartial referee” 
comes up against “the concomitant necessity that the pro se litigant’s 
case be fully and competently presented.”138 Rather than provide 
judges with a roadmap for resolving the conflict, the Austin court 
hedged and held that the judge’s duty to unrepresented parties 
“cannot be fully described by specific formula. Therefore, we prescribe 
none.”139 Ultimately, this sort of doctrine is unhelpful and difficult to 
implement. While judicial discretion is commonly relied upon to carry 
out broad principles, the Austin court provided no principled 
guidance whatsoever. It is difficult to imagine how an individual judge 
might formulate an action plan that both maintains fidelity to the 
passive norm and also cultivates a fully developed record if the 
appellate court itself could not do so. 
 
 136. Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1366 (9th Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit was also 
afraid any judicial assistance in advising pro se litigants of the rule’s requirements would open 
the floodgates toward other types of procedural leniency. The majority noted that “imposing an 
obligation to give notice of . . . evidentiary standards would . . . invite an undesirable, open-
ended participation by the court in the summary judgment process.” Id. at 1365. But see Rand 
v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (modifying the holding in Jacobsen 
to require courts to notify pro se prisoners—but not other litigants—of the Rule 56 summary 
judgment obligations). 
 137. For a rare example of a court applauding judicial assistance to a pro se party, see Oko 
v. Rogers, 466 N.E.2d 658, 660–61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). The Court in Oko did not articulate 
forward-looking principles regarding judicial assistance for the unrepresented, but it did hold 
that the specific assistance provided by the judge did not prejudice the opponent. Id. 
 138. 408 A.2d 784, 785 (N.H. 1979). 
 139. Id. at 785 (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted). 
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The case of Nelson v. Jacobsen provides a second illustration of the 
courts’ equivocation.140 The Utah Supreme Court first indicated that 
judges should strike an active stance in hearings involving 
unrepresented litigants, stating that, “because of his lack of technical 
knowledge of law and procedure [the pro se party] should be accorded 
every consideration that may reasonably be indulged.”141 But, when it 
came to defining the contours of the judge’s specific duties in this 
context, the court backpedaled and withdrew its endorsement of a 
more active role.142 Specifically, the court cautioned that a judge is not 
required to “translate legal terms, explain legal rules, or otherwise 
attempt to redress the ongoing consequences of the party’s” pro se 
status.143 While the Nelson decision ostensibly authorizes judges to 
take action to assist unrepresented litigants, the call for leniency 
cannot truly be fulfilled. After all, if the judge ascribes to the limits 
suggested by Nelson—and does not pause to define a legal term—
what type of “consideration” for pro se parties remains? 
A number of courts have mimicked the approach taken in Nelson: 
an articulation of support for the notion that courts should provide 
pro se parties with a meaningful opportunity to present their cases, 
followed by a directive stressing the importance of passive judging—
thus preventing the judge from paying more than lip service to the 
needs of the unrepresented.144 Nelson and its cohort result in a 
confused and contradictory doctrine. The courts acknowledge that 
unrepresented litigants cannot fulfill the norm of party control—and 
seem to suggest relaxation of adversary procedure—but then strip that 
rhetoric of meaning by circumscribing the judge’s ability to take 
remedial measures. 
Russell Engler posits that some of the courts’ inflexible and 
contradictory jurisprudence in pro se cases may arise because courts 
 
 140. 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983). 
 141. Id. at 1213 (brackets in source omitted) (quoting Heathman v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990, 
991 (Utah 1962)). 
   142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See, e.g., Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277–78 (4th Cir. 1985); 
Allen v. Friel, 194 P.3d 903, 908–09 (Utah 2008); see also Gamet v. Blanchard, 91 Cal. App. 
4th 1276, 1284–85 (2001) (determining that, despite pro se litigants not being entitled to any 
special treatment, “there is no reason that a judge cannot take affirmative steps . . . Judges are 
charged with ascertaining the truth, not just playing the referee.”). 
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tend to recycle stock language from previous decisions without regard 
to context.145 Specifically, some courts have taken a firm stance on 
judicial passivity in cases involving vexatious litigants or litigants who 
self-represent by choice, in order to rein in the conduct of those 
perceived as using pro se status to manipulate the system.146 Other 
courts then apply those holdings to far more sympathetic pro se 
parties—those who are one-shot players and simply too poor to afford 
counsel—without analysis as to whether the same principles should 
continue to govern.147 While this may be a contributing factor, it also 
seems clear that the courts have been flat-out stubborn in refusing to 
take seriously the breakdown of adversary procedure in run-of-the mill 
matters and the need to craft a responsive doctrine. 
B. The “Accommodation” Doctrine 
New ethical guidance in the Model Code of Judicial Conduct 
takes a somewhat more evolved approach to addressing the judicial 
role in cases involving unrepresented parties, but, ultimately, with little 
impact. In 2007, comment four to the “impartiality” canon was 
updated to permit judges to “make reasonable accommodations to 
ensure pro se litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly 
heard.”148 The Model Code does not define “accommodation,” but a 
number of jurisdictions have set forth particular examples of 
acceptable judicial actions.149 The actions specified include explaining 
procedure, making referrals to Legal Aid lawyers, avoiding the use of 
jargon, re-ordering the taking of evidence, and explaining the basis for 
a ruling.150 The accommodation doctrine also appears in appellate 
rulings in the state of Alaska and, more recently, California. A number 
of advisory boards charged with developing suggested protocols for 
 
  145. Russell Engler, Ethics in Transition: Unrepresented Litigants and the Changing 
Judicial Role, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 367, 370–71 (2008). 
 146. Id. at 370–71, 386, 396. 
 147. Id. at 371–72. 
 148. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2, r. 2.2 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007). 
  149. See, e.g., COLO. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2, r. 2.6 cmt. 2 (COLO. JUD. 
BRANCH 2010); IOWA CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2, r. 51:2.2 cmt. 4 (JUD. 
QUALIFICATIONS COMM’N 2010); OHIO CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2, r. 2.2 cmt. 4, r. 
2.6 cmt. 1A (OHIO SUP. CT. 2015). In one more permissive locality, the judge may ask “neutral” 
questions of the parties. D.C. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2, r. 2.6 cmt. 1A (D.C. 
CTS. 2016). 
 150. See, e.g., id. 
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judges in pro se matters have thrown their support behind the 
accommodation approach as well.151 
At least twenty jurisdictions have adopted the exact language of 
comment 4 or substantially similar language.152 In a typical example, 
the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct now allows judges to provide 
“brief information about the proceeding and evidentiary and 
foundational requirements.”153 The Colorado Code of Judicial 
Conduct also endorses judicial efforts to ensure that unrepresented 
parties understand the court process, but concludes with the 
admonishment that “[s]elf-represented litigants are still required to 
comply with the same substantive law and procedural requirements as 
represented litigants.”154 Only the District of Columbia recommends 
that judges “should” make the foregoing accommodations and also 
suggests that judges ask “neutral” questions of the parties.155 All other 
states make the granting of a pro se accommodation 
entirely discretionary.156 
Advisory protocols for judges handling pro se cases also embrace 
the accommodation approach. In keeping with the amended ethical 
guidance, these protocols authorize only limited accommodations. 
Idaho has produced a judicial protocol that allows for basic 
explanation of how the proceeding will unfold, explanation of the 
elements, explanation of the burden of proof, and explanation of the 
rules of evidence.157 Judges are admonished not to ask questions unless 
 
 151. See infra note 157. 
 152. Most jurisdictions that have adopted revised Judicial Codes since 2007 have 
incorporated a version of comment 4. This includes Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, 
the District of Columbia Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, New Mexico, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, 
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. A few states, however, such as Kansas and Delaware, have 
chosen to exclude the language from comment 4 in amending their Judicial Codes. 
 153. OHIO CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2, r. 2.6 cmt. 1A (OHIO SUP. CT. 2015); see 
also id. at Canon 2, r. 2.2 cmt. 4. 
 154. COLO. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2, r. 2.6 cmt. 2 (COLO. JUD. 
BRANCH 2010). 
 155. D.C. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2, r. 2.6 cmt. 1A (D.C. CTS. 2016). 
 156. See, e.g., OHIO CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2, r. 2.2 cmt. 4 (OHIO SUP. CT. 
2015) (providing that a judge “may make reasonable accommodations to a self-represented 
litigant.” (emphasis added)). 
 157. JOEL HORTON, COMM. TO INCREASE ACCESS TO THE CTS., PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
TO BE USED BY IDAHO JUDGES DURING HEARINGS INVOLVING SELF-REPRESENTED 
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they are general in nature.158 Massachusetts has also promulgated 
guidelines allowing judges to inform pro se litigants that their trials 
will be conducted according to the rules of evidence and procedure, 
to explain briefly what those are, and to permit judges to ask clarifying 
or general questions.159 The protocol adopted by the Delaware 
Supreme Court is the most expansive, encouraging a judge to ask 
general questions, communicate judicial expectations, and modify 
procedures—although there is no specificity regarding which 
procedures would be appropriate to modify.160 
Courts in Alaska and California have taken the most liberal stance 
on judicial accommodations, and yet these jurisdictions go only so far 
as to suggest that judges must, rather than may, provide basic 
procedural explanations to unrepresented parties in certain limited 
circumstances. In opinions that pre-date the amendments to the 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, the Alaska Supreme Court has 
advanced the rule that a judge must explain to a pro se litigant the 
proper procedure for an action she is “obviously attempting to 
accomplish.”161 On the flip side, Alaskan courts have clarified that 
there is no duty to provide explanation to an unrepresented individual 
who has failed to make at least a defective attempt to comply with 
procedure.162 Thus, an unrepresented litigant who writes a letter to the 
judge seeking to intervene in a case is entitled to instruction on proper 
methods for achieving her objective,163 but an unrepresented litigant 
who simply fails to obtain his medical records in a medical malpractice 
case is not entitled to instruction on the existence of discovery rules 




 158. Id. 
 159. Guidelines for Pre-Hearing Interaction, MASS CT. SYS. JUD. INS. § 2.1 (2006), 
http://www.mass.gov/courts/court-info/trial-court/exec-office/ocm/jud-institute/pre-
hearing-interaction-with-commentary-gen.html. 
 160. DELAWARE COURTS, DELAWARE’S JUDICIAL GUIDELINES FOR CIVIL HEARINGS 
INVOLVING SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS 2–4 (2011), http://courts.delaware.gov/supreme
/admdir/ad178guidelines.pdf. 
 161. Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987). 
 162. Bauman v. State Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 768 P.2d 1097, 1098–99 
(Alaska 1989). 
 163. Keating v. Traynor, 833 P.2d 695, 696 (Alaska 1992). 
 164. Kaiser v. Sakata, 40 P.3d 800, 802, 804 (Alaska 2002). 
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The California case of Ross v. Figueroa has been cited as an 
example of growing permissiveness around judicial accommodations 
and a significant modification, even expansion, of the judicial role.165 
Yet, in that case, the appellate court merely opined, in dicta, that a 
judge must explain to an unrepresented litigant barred from entering 
written testimony into the record that he has the right to testify to the 
same facts orally.166 While Ross is unique in that it suggests action by a 
judge may be required, rather than simply authorized, to avoid a clear 
miscarriage of justice, the opinion is distressingly narrow. The Ross 
decision does no more than urge a judge to explain just one basic 
procedural right—the right to provide oral testimony—to a pro se 
litigant facing a permanent restraining order who otherwise would 
sacrifice his only opportunity to rebut an ex-girlfriend’s allegations of 
violence.167 The Ross court did not endorse or discuss other duties to 
assist the unrepresented with case development. 
The accommodation doctrine is touted as an attempt to “level[] 
the playing field”168 for growing numbers of pro se litigants in the civil 
justice system, and to enhance “the role of the courts in promoting 
access to justice. . . .”169 Commentators strongly support efforts to 
improve upon judicial explanation, instruction, referrals, and 
demeanor, and it is undoubtedly a step in the right direction to 
provide judges with examples of permissible conduct that is specific, 
practical, and easy to implement in the pro se context.170 However, the 
 
 165. See CTR. FOR FAM., CHILD., JUD. COUNCIL OF CA. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE CTS., & 
THE CTS., HANDLING CASES INVOLVING SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS: A BENCHGUIDE FOR 
JUDICIAL OFFICERS  2-1 (2007), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/benchguide_self_
rep_litigants.pdf. 
 166. Ross v. Figueroa, 139 Cal. App. 4th 856, 866–68 (2006). 
 167. Id. at 859–61, 866–68. 
 168. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT: REPORTER’S EXPLANATION OF CHANGES 
Canon 2 r. 2.2 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba
/migrated/judicialethics/mcjc_2007.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 169. OHIO CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2, r. 2.6 cmt. 1A (OHIO SUP. CT. 2015). 
 170. See generally Rebecca A. Albrecht et al., Judicial Techniques for Cases Involving Self-
Representing Litigants, 42 JUDGES J., Winter 2003, at 16, 45–48 (analyzing the current guidance 
to judges regarding pro se litigants and possible reforms to improve access and support for pro 
se litigants); Paris R. Baldacci, Assuring Access to Justice: The Role of the Judge in Assisting Pro Se 
Litigants in Litigating Their Cases in New York City’s Housing Court, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y 
& ETHICS J. 659, 670–96 (2006) (discussing possible solutions to problems faced by pro se 
litigants in New York housing courts); Jona Goldschmidt, Judicial Assistance to Self-Represented 
Litigants: Lessons from the Canadian Experience, 17 MICH. ST. U. COLL. J. INT’L L. 601, 607–
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updated guidance commits a crime of omission in ignoring pro se 
deficits in factual and legal case development and skimming over the 
hurdles an unrepresented party might face in effectively carrying out 
procedural direction. The position taken by the accommodation 
doctrine—that basic technical assistance on the part of the judge will 
enable party participation and promote a fair result—reflects an under-
appreciation of the extent of the problem and obscures the depth of 
adversary breakdown in two-party civil cases. 
To offer a window into the insufficiency of the accommodation 
doctrine, I return to Anita’s case.171 The judge handling Anita’s 
habitability matter took advantage of most allowable 
accommodations. He offered Anita a referral to a Legal Aid lawyer. 
He explained an important rule of evidentiary admissibility and gave 
basic instruction on how to comply with it. He defined the term 
“authenticate,” thereby eliminating the use of unnecessary jargon. He 
allowed Anita to testify in narrative form rather than in the typical 
question-and-answer format of a direct examination. He gave her 
more than one opportunity to add anything to the record that she 
deemed important. Finally, he advised Anita that the adverse ruling 
was compelled by her failure to produce reliable evidence to support 
the alleged housing code violations or the damages she sustained. 
Still, Anita’s judge jettisoned the search for truth and failed to 
reach an accurate, merits-based decision. Anita performed her case 
duties inadequately on every front. Her narrative omitted facts in 
support of the legal element of notice. She was unsuccessful in 
admitting into the record the building inspector’s report, which was 
the key piece of documentary evidence in her case. And she asked for 
improper relief. Even though the judge employed the full range of pro 
se accommodations, he both failed to learn the true facts of what had 
transpired, and inadvertently denied Anita meaningful participation in 
her matter. Some procedural justice scholars insist that narrative 
 
09 (2008–2009) (examining the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct’s addition of comment 
4 to Rule 2.2 allowing reasonable accommodations for pro se litigants); Gray, Reaching Out, 
supra note 126 (recommending various techniques for judges in cases with pro se parties); 
Wilson & Hutchins, supra note 123, at 125; Richard Zorza, The Disconnect Between the 
Requirements of Judicial Neutrality and Those of the Appearance of Neutrality When Parties 
Appear Pro Se: Causes, Solutions, Recommendations, and Implications, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
423, 438–45 (2004) (discussing the importance of assisting pro se parties in preserving neutrality 
in the court room). 
 171. See supra Part III. 
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testimony is critical for the unrepresented, in that it promotes both 
litigant autonomy and dignity.172 However, Anita’s case makes clear 
that offering leeway to present an unstructured narrative, without any 
guideposts to indicate the course it should take, may actually deprive 
a party of a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Anita spoke at 
length—and may have experienced relief at telling her story—but she 
had facts and evidence at her disposal that entitled her to relief, and 
yet she lost because mechanisms that might have aided her 
participation in the case were absent.173 
As Anita’s case highlights, courts and ethics bodies have given 
rushed and inadequate treatment to the intersection of adversary 
norms and pro se civil justice. An unrepresented party who receives a 
judicial accommodation will continue to have enormous additional 
case needs—investigation of the matter, identification of helpful facts, 
synthesis of controlling law, admission of evidence, oral case 
presentation in open court, and articulation of a request for available 
relief. Given the extensive challenges faced by the unrepresented in 
communicating relevant facts and legal theories, as well as securing 
appropriate remedies, even well-meaning efforts by a judge to offer 
procedural explanations are likely to have very little impact in helping 
pro se litigants fulfill the norm of party control.174 
If the doctrinal approach to adversary procedure and the 
unrepresented were merely ineffective, it might be regarded as 
harmless. But the recent proliferation of rules and policies related to 
judicial accommodations has an unintended effect: it perpetuates the 
mirage of a functional adversary system in the civil courts. The judge 
in Anita’s case might have reached a more accurate outcome by asking 
 
 172. Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client 
Narrative, 100 YALE L. J. 2107, 2111, 2146 (1991). 
 173. See Colleen F. Shanahan, Anna E. Carpenter & Alyx Mark, Lawyers, Power, and 
Strategic Expertise, 93 DENV. L. REV. 469 (2016) (offering another interesting perspective on 
whether “telling one’s story” produces a fair result, or even a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard. In their empirical study of nearly 1,800 unemployment insurance cases, they present 
evidence that claimants who withheld testimony were more likely to prevail). 
 174. One might even question whether the trend toward judicial accommodations qualifies 
as a new doctrine at all. As Cynthia Gray has noted, procedural accommodations are not a tool 
available only to the unrepresented. Gray, Reaching Out, supra note 126, at 100.  For instance, 
any lawyer appearing in a new jurisdiction for the first time would feel free to ask a judge for 
explanation on a local rule, and the judge who responds to the request would hardly be 
considered partial as a result. 
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Anita whether she notified her landlord of the poor conditions, asking 
foundational questions to independently ascertain the authenticity of 
the inspection report and ensure its admission into the record, 
proposing to Anita that she seek damages, and eliciting facts related 
to injuries or lost compensation experienced by her family. Yet none 
of these actions are considered ethically permissible as judicial 
accommodations, and the evolving guidelines for judges evidence no 
recognition that such assistance might be necessary. 
The modern-day theory and doctrine of civil judging in small, 
two-party state court matters might be fairly summarized as this: a 
strong traditional norm of passivity, barely relaxed by the discretion to 
make explanatory accommodations when one or more parties are 
unrepresented. However, Anita’s example demonstrates that neither 
the passive norm nor the accommodation approach is likely to result 
in fair or accurate decision-making in a majority pro se court. As 
explored in Part V, inadequate doctrine has left trial judges to their 
own devices in determining how to adjudicate pro se cases, which has 
resulted in regular, sizable, and inconsistent departures from 
adversary principles. 
V. AD HOC JUDGING AND THE UNINTENDED COSTS OF 
PERPETUATING THE ADVERSARY MIRAGE 
This Part elaborates on the unintended costs of holding judges to 
an adversary “ideal” in matters involving the unrepresented. Existing 
doctrine props up the illusion that, with a couple of tweaks, it is 
reasonable to rely on the norm of party control even in the face of 
systemic lack of counsel. And yet the degree of adversary breakdown 
in the average two-party case far exceeds any correction a procedural 
accommodation is capable of making. 
In this Part, I identify three consequences of imposing outdated 
adversary procedure on pro se cases. First, judges often ignore it: in a 
quest for merits-based decisions, they depart from the passive norm—
and often do so in substantial ways. Second, judges must rely on 
instinct, discretion, and knee-jerk reaction in crafting their procedural 
methods, which can result in “active” practices that fail to achieve an 
accurate outcome. Last, judges are beset by a deepening role 
confusion concerning the bounds of their authority in pro se matters, 
which exacerbates the unreliable and shifting procedure emerging in 
small case civil justice. The purpose of this Part is not to excoriate civil 
judges, but to illuminate the scope of the difficulties they face and to 
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make visible the imperfect procedures that materialize when judges are 
forced to operate in the shadow of unworkable standards of conduct. 
A. Regular, Sizable, and Inconsistent Adversary Departures 
Because adversary doctrine works at odds with the fundamental 
goal of basing decisions on the relevant law and facts, many judges 
simply disregard it—and do so completely under the radar. The 
dockets in most civil courts would grind to a halt if judges did not find 
ways to assist the unrepresented parties who appear before them. As 
such, it has become routine for judges to employ a range of 
unsanctioned adversary departures. In today’s civil justice system, 
many judges engage in precisely the type of substantive case 
development prohibited by adversary doctrine: they frame legal 
theories, elicit facts, suggest remedies, and invent new procedures. 
However, their approach is ad hoc, variable, and inconsistent. 
Very little research documents the particulars of this phenomenon, 
but one must spend only a few hours in the civil courts to observe 
frequent and sizable departures from the passive norm. Noted 
adversary scholar Stephan Landsman confirms that, “throughout the 
country,” judges operate with “virtually unfettered discretion” in pro 
se cases, which “yield[s] strikingly inconsistent treatment of such 
parties.”175 Paris Baldacci observes that, in New York City’s Housing 
Courts, some judges elicit legally relevant narratives from the parties 
before them, but do so in the absence of “training, guidelines, 
administrative support or peer assistance.”176 In one regularly cited 
survey, judges reported that their policies for adjudicating pro se cases 
are “individually formulated,” with some judges willing to actively 
question the unrepresented, and others far less liberal in their 
treatment of pro se parties.177 
 
 175. Landsman, Growing Challenge, supra note 13, at 450–51. 
 176. Baldacci, supra note 170, at 665. 
 177. Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle for Access to Justice: Meeting the 
Challenge of Bench and Bar Resistance, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36, 55–57 (2002); see also Russell G. 
Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the Market for Justice: Why Access to Lawyers Will Never Solve the 
Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 969, 978 
(2004) (noting that as a practical matter, some judges are already providing substantial assistance 
to pro se litigants). 
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The journalist Kat Aaron describes two cases in Detroit’s 36th 
District Court that illustrate judicial departures from adversary 
procedure, but also highlight the inconsistency with which departures 
are deployed.178 In one case, a “soft-spoken” tenant defended herself 
in an eviction suit for nonpayment of rent.179 She believed her rent 
subsidy had been sent to the wrong landlord, but had “difficulty 
advancing an argument on her own behalf.”180 The judge could have 
remained passive and swiftly processed the eviction in favor of the 
landlord, but refused to do so. Instead, she “coaxed facts out of both 
sides,” tried to “get a handle on who owed what to whom,” and made 
efforts to determine “what, besides eviction, was possible.”181 Rather 
than issue a judgment without a full airing of the facts, the judge cast 
aside adversary doctrine and attempted to resuscitate the 
tenant’s claim.  
In a second case, however, a judge in the same court took the 
inverse approach. An elderly maintenance worker filed a claim to 
contest the garnishment of his wages, but at the hearing told the judge 
he did not owe the underlying debt, and in fact, “had no idea what 
the debt was.”182 Aaron recounts the judge’s response: 
The judge told him that in order to make that argument, he would 
have had to contest the underlying debt, not the garnishment itself. 
The judge didn’t tell him how to do that, though. She didn’t make 
any effort to get to the truth of the matter, moving forward with the 
case despite the possibility that the collections agency had the wrong 
man. While the judge was talking, the defendant kept muttering 
under his breath. I was in the second row, close enough to hear him, 
and he was saying, “I’m so lost. I’m so lost.”183 
Across various jurisdictions, judicial appetite for adversary 
departures varies considerably. In New York, a trial judge explains 
that, in housing cases, most judges allow “pro se litigants to testify in 
 
 178. Kat Aaron, The People’s Court?, THE AM. PROSPECT (Nov. 21, 2013), 
http://prospect.org/article/peoples-court. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
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narrative form and then ask them questions to navigate their story.”184 
He also asserts that housing court judges often prevent lawyers from 
engaging in a “barrage of interruptions or objections,” and raise valid 
objections on behalf of unrepresented parties when their opponents 
attempt to enter inadmissible evidence into the record.185 However, 
Bruce Bohlman, a judge in North Dakota maintains that, in his 
courthouse, the opposite approach prevails.186 Despite an 
“empowering mandate” set forth by the North Dakota Supreme 
Court in 1916 permitting judges to “elicit the evidence upon material 
and relevant points,” Judge Bohlman believes that most trial judges 
are so culturally accustomed to the adversary system, they are “hesitant 
to comply.”187 
These examples underscore the risks associated with imposing an 
unrealistic procedural system on the courts. By upholding the passive 
norm, existing doctrine spurs rogue judging and inadvertently 
fragments procedure into a collection of changing rules. 
B. Ad Hoc Judging and the Out-of-Reach “Fair” Outcome 
A second cost of outdated adversary doctrine is that it forces 
judicial improvisation in departing from adversary norms, which can 
result in active practices that do not necessarily further a fair outcome. 
Relying on recent firsthand observations of judges in an ordinary 
domestic violence court, I offer two up-close examples of typical 
adversary departures and examine why procedural practices guided by 
instinct and gut reaction may fall short in advancing accurate results. 
First, consider an exchange between a judge and an unrepresented 
petitioner seeking a protection order, which exemplifies a 
representative form of judicial fact development in a pro se court: 
Judge: You said he did stuff in May and June. What? 
 
 184. Gerald Lebovits & Julia Marter, Evidentiary Issues in the New York Housing Court, 
38 N.Y. REAL PROP. L.J. 21, 27–28 (2010). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Bruce E. Bohlman & Erick J. Bohlman, Wandering in the Wilderness of Dispute 
Resolution: When Do We Arrive at the Promised Land of Justice?, 70 N.D. L. REV. 235, 
241 (1994). 
 187. Id.; see also PUB. JUSTICE CTR., supra note 110, at 22 (noting that judges in 
Baltimore’s housing court also tend to remain passive). 
DOCUMENT6 (DO NOT DELETE) 8/18/2016  5:51 AM 
899 Adversary Breakdown and Judicial Role Confusion 
 941 
Petitioner: Threatening stuff. 
Judge: What? 
Petitioner: That he’ll take me to court. 
Judge: Not what I mean. Did he threaten to harm you? 
Petitioner: He said he was going to kill me. 
Judge: When? 
Petitioner: So many times. 
Judge: When? I need testimony. 
Petitioner: In June was one time. 
Judge: What did he say? 
Petitioner: ‘I’m going to kill you.’ 
Judge: By phone? In person? 
Petitioner: By phone. 
Judge: How did it make you feel? 
Petitioner: Scared for my life. 
In this excerpt, the petitioner had difficulty with two aspects of 
case development: first, she was unable to identify a legally relevant 
form of threatening conduct; second, once she spoke to a cognizable 
threat, she was unable to provide details specific enough to meet her 
burden of proof. Adversary doctrine would have punished the 
petitioner with a prompt dismissal once she indicated that her ex-
boyfriend threatened litigation rather than violence. Furthermore, 
adversary doctrine offers no provision for the judge to drill down on 
precise and detailed facts. Thus, the petitioner’s claim likely would 
have failed even if she had raised the violent nature of the threat since, 
initially, she provided no details on when the threat occurred, how it 
was delivered, precisely what was said, and how it made her feel. 
In lieu of dismissing the case—as the Lombardi playbook would 
dictate188—the judge prompted the petitioner by asking a series of 
questions that toggled between open-ended and leading. Specifically, 
the judge led with broad questions that began with “what” or 
 
 188. See infra Part III. 
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“when,” but when those questions failed to yield legally relevant or 
sufficient answers, she followed up with narrower, more specific 
questions that hinted at the “correct” answer. In other words, the 
judge not only signaled to the petitioner that the type of threat she 
described would not suffice, but was explicit about a particular form 
of conduct that would satisfy the legal standard. She also took pains 
to boost the sufficiency of the record by eliciting both dates and 
verbatim statements related to the respondent’s alleged misconduct. 
It would be reasonable to conclude that the judge in this case 
effectively drew out the petitioner’s best facts. But the exchange also 
highlights the risks of an ad hoc approach. In making an on-the-spot 
decision about how to circumvent adversary doctrine, the judge 
impatiently pushed for responsive answers without pausing to allow 
the petitioner’s story to take shape naturally. As a result, it is difficult 
to know whether the judge elicited truthful facts, or merely steered 
the narrative into a conventional frame. 
A second exchange in the same domestic violence court similarly 
exposes the hazards of unregulated active judging. In that case, an 
unrepresented female petitioner requested a protection order against 
her former boyfriend, with whom she shared children. The petitioner 
primarily sought a stay-away provision as part of the order; she wanted 
to ensure that her abuser would be prohibited from visiting her or 
contacting her. But toward the conclusion of her testimony, the 
petitioner appeared to enlarge her set of concerns. She said to the 
judge, “What about my kids? They have seen [the respondent] 
threaten me.” The judge, without further questioning, added 
mandatory parenting classes to the order entered against 
the respondent. 
The petitioner did not attach any specific request to the statements 
she made about her children, and it is not clear whether her concerns 
related to custody, the children’s physical or psychological well-being, 
or a sense that the respondent’s parenting skills were deficient in some 
way. Perhaps she was simply unburdening herself of an additional 
detail in a deeply traumatic experience. Under adversary doctrine, the 
petitioner would be required to formulate her own legal theories and 
articulate a proper request for relief.189 The judge, however, did not 
allow the factual details to lay dormant; instead, she seized on the 
 
 189. Frost, supra note 8, at 455-59. 
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petitioner’s concern for her children and connected it to an available 
form of relief. In granting a remedy not requested by the petitioner, 
the judge departed from the passive norm. 
The judge’s adversary departure can be viewed as justifiable—even 
essential—but also poorly executed. First, she did not seek the 
petitioner’s input on the remedy prior to imposing it. Most likely, the 
judge ordered the parenting classes in an effort to be responsive to the 
petitioner’s concerns. And yet the effort may have been misplaced, as 
the petitioner herself was not properly consulted before the relief was 
issued. Second, the judge did not gather additional facts to determine 
whether the remedy she ordered was appropriately tailored to the 
circumstances of the case. Presumably, if asked, the petitioner could 
have shared specifics about the ages of her children, the nature of their 
relationship with their father, and what they witnessed. Upon 
gathering this information, the judge might still have deemed 
mandatory parenting classes the best available remedy, but just as 
likely, she could have decided that drug counseling or an award of 
temporary custody was in order. 
As these examples demonstrate, judges who are dissatisfied with 
the quality of justice dispensed on their pro se dockets must invent 
their own methods for adjudicating claims. However, improvised 
procedure is fraught with complications of its own, especially on a busy 
docket when judges may be hurried and harried. Even assuming 
judges in the preceding examples were pure of heart, their procedural 
choices did not necessarily advance the goal of fair process. It is a 
second unintended cost of adversary doctrine that, as a substitute for 
carrying out its dictates, judges are instead stitching together a 
patchwork of flawed ad hoc procedures that may not function as well 
as they anticipate. 
C. Deepening Judicial Role Confusion 
A final consequence of existing adversary doctrine is that it creates 
deep-seated judicial role confusion in the average two-party case. A 
recent employment case in the Eastern District of New York depicts 
the confused state of the judiciary when it comes to cases involving 
the unrepresented.190 Aikam Floyd sued the sandwich shop Cosi for 
 
 190. See Floyd v. Cosi, Inc., 78 F.Supp.3d 558 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
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retaliation and discrimination.191 However, at a hearing in the case, 
Mr. Floyd evidenced almost no ability to digest the proceedings or 
articulate his facts.192 Judge Jack Weinstein presided over the case and, 
like other judges faced with similar circumstances, he felt forced to 
break with adversary doctrine in order to reach a merits-based result. 
Judge Weinstein assisted Mr. Floyd both in developing a legal theory 
and establishing that his claim was not time-barred.193 Immediately 
after these exchanges took place, however, Judge Weinstein took the 
extraordinary step of recusing himself from the case.194 In his recusal 
decision, he expressed distress over the role he had played in 
developing Mr. Floyd’s legal theories, as well as the active judicial 
involvement that he predicted would be necessary—and yet 
prohibited—as the case progressed.195 
Mr. Floyd had difficulties with case development from the outset. 
He told the judge that his supervisor had forged his signature on 
disciplinary notices, but then provided a circuitous, difficult-to-follow 
story that had no apparent connection to a legal cause of action.196 At 
the conclusion of his factual testimony, however, Mr. Floyd provided 
a relevant detail, telling the judge he had been called “lizard man” at 
work.197 Judge Weinstein pitched in to assist Mr. Floyd in articulating 
a legal theory supported by his facts: 
The Court: And now you are claiming on what? 
Mr. Floyd: The Title VII, the first one, act [sic] of 1964. 
 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Transcript of Record at 5–6, Floyd, 78 F.Supp.3d 558 (No. 14-CV-03772). 
 194. Memorandum & Order at 2, 5, Floyd, 78 F.Supp.3d 558. 
 195. Id.; Floyd, 78 F.Supp.3d. 
 196. A snippet of Mr. Floyd’s testimony is as follows: “I told [my supervisor, Mike] I was 
not coming in and he told me to leave a message, I mean, write a note pretty much, so I wrote 
the note and I put it under the door. At the time we didn’t have a board. Now we have a board 
at this time, but we didn’t have a board then so we can stick it on. Now we have a board. But at 
the time I put the note under his door, so he said—I told him and I did what he asked, I wrote 
the note, I acknowledged what he said, and I gave notification to the court—not the court, to 
Mike to let him know I wasn’t coming in. I had called the store, because the employee told me 
I was fired, so I called the store, got on the phone. Mike he said, [‘]I’m tired of you. I’m tired 
of your bs[]. You’re fired.[‘]” Transcript of Record at 5–6, Floyd, 78 F.Supp.3d 558. 
 197. Id. at 7. 
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The Court: Based on what? 
Mr. Floyd: Harassment. 
The Court: No. On your ethnicity, is that it? 
Mr. Floyd: Yes. 
The Court: You claim you are being discriminated against 
because you are African-American? 
Mr. Floyd: Yes, sir. I have been at this job for seven years.198 
In a separate segment, Mr. Floyd struggled to identify his final 
date of employment and the most recent instance of alleged 
discrimination.199 In order to establish that Mr. Floyd had initiated his 
case within the applicable statute of limitations, Judge Weinstein 
elicited the following facts: 
The Court: What was the last date you were 
discriminated against? 
Mr. Floyd: The last date I was discriminated against is—I don’t 
remember the last day I worked, sorry, sir. 
The Court: Well, approximately? 
Mr. Floyd: Within a couple of months. . . . Probably like the 
27th of March, I believe was my last date. 
. . . .  
The Court [to opposing counsel]: When is the last date he 
stopped working? Do you have that? 
Ms. Jonak: On information and belief, your Honor, it’s a date 
in August 2013. 
The Court: August 2013. He filed in September 2013, which 
would be timely, if we have a continuing violation, correct? 
Mr. Floyd: Yes, sir.200 
Without Judge Weinstein’s assistance, it is unlikely Mr. Floyd 
would have asserted a valid legal claim or been able to establish that 
 
 198. Id. at 8–9. 
 199. Id. at 10–11. 
 200. Id. 
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his case should survive a statute of limitations challenge by Cosi. The 
judge directed Mr. Floyd toward the proper legal theory—
discrimination—and away from one that was not supported by his 
facts. Furthermore, in order to establish that the claim could proceed, 
the judge inquired as to Mr. Floyd’s final day on the job—even 
overriding Mr. Floyd’s own testimony on the matter—and made an 
inferential leap to conclude that Mr. Floyd had experienced a 
“continuing violation,” one that persisted until his last day of work.201 
At the conclusion of this hearing, Judge Weinstein recused himself 
from the case sua sponte.202 In his recusal order, the judge reflected on 
his discomfort with violating the passive norm, and yet his belief that 
doing so was necessary.203 He asserted that “pro se justice is an 
oxymoron,” and that the case “required intervention by the court.”204 
However, he also acknowledged that in assuming an active role, and 
posing “leading questions,” his impartiality in the matter might be 
compromised.205 The judge was conflicted about the propriety of the 
assistance he had extended to Mr. Floyd, but was equally 
uncomfortable allowing Mr. Floyd to flounder.206 In the end, role 
confusion so paralyzed Judge Weinstein that he was unable to perform 
his job as a judge at all. 
Like Judge Weinstein, a number of state court judges who handle 
typical two-party matters have been candid that they are confused as 
to their proper role in a pro se case and unsure of the boundaries of 
their own authority. The Honorable Gerard Hardcastle, a trial judge 
in Nevada, laments that “no one has told judges what is to be done,” 
and muses that “[a]ppellate courts probably believe the family trial 
courts are following the rules of evidence and procedure attached to 
the adversarial process.”207 The Honorable Rebecca Albrecht, a former 
 
 201. Id. 
 202. Memorandum & Order at 2, 5, Floyd, 78 F.Supp.3d 558. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id.; Floyd, 78 F.Supp.3d at 560–61. 
 205. Memorandum & Order at 2, 4, Floyd, 78 F.Supp.3d 558; Floyd, 78 F.Supp.3d 
at 560–61. 
 206. See Memorandum & Order at 4, Floyd, 78 F.Supp.3d 558; Floyd, 78 F.Supp.3d at 
561 (In the recusal order, the judge said that, if he were to continue presiding over the case, he 
would be “forced,” by Mr. Floyd’s pro se status, to continue to intervene on his behalf.). 
 207. Gerald W. Hardcastle, Adversarialism and the Family Court: A Family Court Judge’s 
Perspective, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 57, 120 (2005). 
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trial judge in Arizona, asserts that, in cases involving the 
unrepresented, “[t]rial judges have no common understanding of the 
applicable ethical standards, case law, or practical techniques to use to 
ensure that justice is done in their courtrooms.”208 And the Honorable 
Ron Spears, a trial judge in Illinois, notes that judges are 
“uncomfortable” assisting the unrepresented and often feel they are 
walking a “dangerous tightrope” where allowable guidance and 
impermissible advocacy are not clearly distinguished.209 Most striking 
about the judges’ remarks is that they express uncertainty about 
aspects of their work that arise with great frequency. In demanding 
exclusive reliance on the parties’ case presentation skills, adversary 
theory and doctrine have created a judiciary uncertain of its 
core function. 
VI. AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY 
In this Part, I propose a framework for what I call “affirmative 
judging” in ordinary, two-party matters. As the preceding Parts 
demonstrate, adversary theory and doctrine are wildly out of touch 
with the degree of procedural breakdown and judicial role confusion 
now present in millions of two-party cases. As a result, judges have 
taken to underground, ad hoc practices to adjudicate basic cases. In 
complex litigation, the judicial role has been greatly enhanced to 
manage pre-trial procedures and post-trial remedies. This Part argues 
for adversary evolution in small-case civil justice as well, and suggests 
a parallel framework for an enlarged judicial role that takes into 
account the distinct needs of civil courts swamped by 
the unrepresented. 
Based primarily on the model of administrative litigation within 
the Social Security Administration (SSA), the “affirmative judge” 
would have the duty to develop the factual and legal record in all cases 
involving an unrepresented party. Affirmative judging may demolish 
conventional adversary procedure, but it would help resurrect many of 
the underlying procedural values of fair process: impartiality, party 
participation, and transparency. Furthermore, imposing an affirmative 
duty on judges to develop the legally relevant facts would trigger a 
basis for appeal in those instances where the record was insufficiently 
built up. The affirmative judging framework is not intended as a rigid 
 
 208. Albrecht, supra note 170, at 16. 
 209. Ron Spears, An Adversary System Without Advocates, 101 ILL. B. J. 592, 593 (2013). 
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prescription, but rather as a flexible doctrine that would be brought 
to life through the exercise of judicial discretion and regularly 
reviewed and honed by the appellate courts. This proposal builds on 
the important work of Russell Pearce and Russell Engler, both of 
whom suggest that an active judge is a critical component of 
equalizing access to justice.210 
Although an affirmative judging framework could work to address 
inequities in many dimensions of the civil court system, this Article 
limits the proposal to cases involving unrepresented parties who 
appear in courts dominated by pro se litigants. At a minimum, this 
includes courts handling housing, family law, consumer, and domestic 
violence claims in almost every jurisdiction in the country. I limit the 
proposal in this way because the problem is most acute in majority pro 
se courts and demands immediate mobilization and action in that 
setting. In addition, majority pro se courts are the venues where judges 
will be most open to this change. Other than the litigants themselves, 
there is nobody more destabilized by the rise of an unrepresented 
majority than the judges who preside over hundreds of pro se cases 
each day. Out of sheer necessity, these judges are most likely to 
embrace clear rules that encourage an expansion of their role. 
Finally, majority pro se courts may very well be the setting where 
lack of representation leads to the greatest unfairness. In most pro se 
courts, the low rate of representation bears no relationship to the merit 
of a claim, as there is typically no structural incentive that might 
motivate attorneys to take on meritorious cases. For example, one can 
make no judgments about the legitimacy of a domestic violence claim 
based on the absence of counsel, as there is no right to attorney’s fees 
on a successful claim, and no pot of damages to divide with an attorney 
who prevails. In a tort case or a civil rights case, by contrast, one might 
assume that the relationship between attorney representation and case 
merit has at least a slightly stronger positive correlation, as meritorious 
matters will lead to financial compensation for the attorney even where 
 
 210. See Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting 
the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987 (1999) [hereinafter 
Engler, And Justice for All]; Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the Market for Justice: 
Why Access to Lawyers Will Never Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges Will 
Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 969 (2004). Some comparative law scholars have also encouraged 
a more active judicial role in the United States. See Robert W. Emerson, Judges as Guardian 
Angels: The German Practice of Hints and Feedback, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 707 (2015). 
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the litigants themselves are unable to afford counsel. It is for these 
reasons that an enhanced role for the judge assumes paramount 
significance in majority pro se courts. 
A. Characteristics of the Affirmative Judge 
Affirmative judging contemplates a duty on the judge to engage 
in three aspects of case development: cultivating legal theories, 
eliciting relevant facts, and granting appropriate remedies. Many 
judges already employ these strategies, albeit in the absence of training 
or authorizing guidelines. With approximately three-quarters of two-
party civil cases involving a pro se party, it is no longer feasible to deny 
judges the ability to participate in developing the factual record.211 The 
affirmative judging model proposed here draws from the 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) example in SSA cases and extends it 
to private law civil matters in the trial courts. ALJs in the Social 
Security disability context have a long history of carrying out an 
affirmative duty to develop the record, making plain that the model is 
workable, produces a clear but flexible standard of conduct, protects 
important aspects of due process, and raises the visibility and 
legitimacy of the adjudicatory process in a majority 
pro se environment. 
1. Comprehensive and consistent judicial case development 
Affirmative judging offers a comprehensive and consistent 
approach to case development. To build the legal framework, the 
judge would set forth common legal theories, present the statutory or 
common law elements, and suggest factual scenarios that satisfy the 
standard. In a domestic violence case, for example, the judge might 
begin by advising the petitioner on a stalking theory in this manner: 
To make out a valid claim for a protection order, you must prove 
that you are the victim of abuse at the hands of a family member or 
intimate partner. One type of “abuse” is “stalking”—you must show 
that the respondent repeatedly followed you or harassed you, that 
the respondent threatened you, and that the respondent wanted to 
scare you. For example, if the respondent showed up at your office 
ten times last week, threatened to hurt you if you didn’t come 
 
 211. See supra note 10. 
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outside to talk to him, and meant to scare you when he did so—that 
is stalking. 
The judge would fulfill the factual development prong by eliciting 
relevant facts on each proposed legal theory. Interviewing theory 
provides a fitting structure for doing so. A judge might initiate open-
ended questions, follow up with directed questions that closely track 
the legal elements, reflect back to the client the information she has 
shared, and conclude with a catch-all question designed to capture any 
non-conforming information.212 To probe the stalking theory, the 
judge might proceed as follows: 
Do you believe the respondent stalked you? On what do you base 
that belief? How did he contact you or attempt to contact you? Can 
you describe the first instance? What was said? How did it make you 
feel? So far, you’ve told me that he came to your office twice, 
uninvited, and each time told you he would kidnap your children 
from school if you refused to speak with him. Is there anything else 
you would like to add? 
Last, the judge executes on the duty to grant proper remedies by 
informing the parties of available relief and inquiring as to eligibility for, 
and interest in, each potential remedy. A judge might wrap up a domestic 
violence case in the following manner: 
In a protection order, I can require the respondent to stay away from 
you for twelve months. I can also order him to participate in 
parenting classes or drug counseling, and I can issue temporary 
custody and visitation orders—if you meet the eligibility criteria. 
Which of these remedies might you be interested in pursuing?  
An affirmative judge would apply the foregoing techniques 
consistently across all parties and all case types. In matters where only one 
party is pro se, affirmative judging can serve to draw out information from 
the represented opponent, as the pro se party is unlikely to have taken 
advantage of discovery or be skilled in the art of cross-examination.213 
 
 212. R. Hal Ritter, Jr. & Patricia A. Wilson, Developing the Fine Art of Listening, 81 MICH. 
B. J. 37, 38 (2002). 
 213. In fact, the affirmative duty is especially important in cases where only one side is pro 
se, as judges may be unlikely to extend assistance to the unrepresented over opposing counsel’s 
objections if doing so is not required. 
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While an affirmative judge takes the reins in a pro se case, there is still 
ample opportunity for parties to add to case development at the 
conclusion of the judge’s questioning. All parties, or their lawyers, can be 
granted the opportunity to present rehabilitative testimony or supplement 
the record in any way they deem fit. 
2. Close alignment with the Social Security model 
The affirmative judging model is closely aligned with well-developed 
adjudicatory procedure in SSA disability cases, lending credence to its 
viability in other civil cases involving unrepresented parties.214 In SSA 
matters, the administrative law judge (ALJ) must “fully and fairly 
develop” the record so that a “just determination of disability” can be 
made prior to the disbursement of government benefits.215 Some circuits 
have further enlarged the judicial role in SSA cases involving 
unrepresented parties, holding that, when counsel is absent, the judge’s 
duty is “especially strong,”216 and may require her to “scrupulously and 
conscientiously probe . . . for . . . relevant facts.”217 
In SSA cases, the claimant retains the burden of proof, 218 but the ALJ 
takes steps to help her meet it, demonstrating that these concepts are not 
incompatible. The judge questions the claimant to elicit testimony,219 
resolves ambiguity and conflicting answers,220 and examines witnesses that 
may have knowledge of key issues.221 Of his role in developing the 
claimant’s record in SSA cases, one ALJ said, “we . . . drag [testimony] 
out of [the claimant] by questioning”, we then “search the law. . . . We 
 
 214. Eighty-one percent of all federal ALJs are assigned to SSA cases, meaning that 
thousands of judges have capably carried out an affirmative duty to develop the record. Jeffrey 
S. Wolfe & Lisa B. Proszek, Interaction Dynamics in Federal Administrative Decision Making: 
The Role of the Inquisitorial Judge and the Adversarial Lawyer, 33 TULSA L.J. 293, 294 (1997). 
 215. See Clark v. Shalala, 28 F.3d 828, 830–31 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting McCoy v. 
Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1147 (8th Cir. 1982); 20 C.F.R. § 404.944 (1988). 
 216. Carter v. Chater, 73 F.3d 1019, 1021 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 217. Brown v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 931, 934–35 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Smith v. 
Schweiker, 677 F.2d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 218. Frank S. Bloch, Jeffrey S. Lubbers & Paul R. Verkuil, Developing A Full and Fair 
Evidentiary Record in a Nonadversary Setting: Two Proposals for Improving Social Security 
Disability Adjudications, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 19 (2003). 
 219. See Rausch v. Gardner, 267 F. Supp. 4, 6 (E.D. Wis. 1967). 
 220. See Brown, 44 F.3d at 935. 
 221. Id. at 936; see generally Frank S. Bloch, Representation and Advocacy at Non-
Adversary Hearings: The Need for Non-Adversary Representatives at Social Security Disability 
Hearings, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 349, 382 n.149 (1981). 
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search our minds, and we search whatever other records are available, we 
search the evidence . . . .” 222 
It makes eminent sense to draw from the administrative model in 
crafting standards of judicial conduct for today’s civil courts.223 It is 
sometimes assumed that procedural safeguards in the judicial system are 
stronger than in the administrative system.224 For instance, in an SSA case, 
the Third Circuit once remarked that due process in the administrative 
setting has to work harder to make up for “the absence of procedural 
safeguards normally available in judicial proceedings.”225 However, the 
procedural safeguards available in traditional courts—among them 
discovery, subpoena power, the rules of evidence, and jury trials—are of 
little use to unrepresented parties who cannot effectively avail themselves 
of their protections.226 Ironically, administrative adjudication, where 
procedures are less formal and the judge assumes a greater role, may now 
be more protective of individual rights than judicial adjudication across a 
large slice of the litigant population. 
An agency like the SSA may be particularly appropriate to emulate as 
the architects of its adjudicatory system understood that it was important 
to design a process “understandable to the layman claimant.”227 Whereas 
the procedural protections available in the civil courts only benefit the few 
parties fortunate enough to retain skilled counsel, the SSA system 
developed its system of rights-protection to respond specifically to the 
needs and capabilities of an unrepresented litigant population. Now that 
the population of the civil courts primarily consists of unrepresented 
 
 222. See Rausch, 267 F. Supp. at 6. 
 223. Scholars have argued that there are rational reasons for ALJs to assume a more 
proactive role than traditional judges, as the ALJ must advance the agency’s mission while the 
civil judge has no such duty. See James E. Moliterno, The Administrative Judiciary’s 
Independence Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1191, 1192, 1211 (2006). However, while civil 
judges have no independent duty to discover the truth, they have other important duties, such 
as the duty to provide all parties with a meaningful opportunity to be heard. This duty is equally 
well served by the affirmative approach. 
 224. See Vivek S. Sankaran, Out of State and Out of Luck: The Treatment of Non-Custodial 
Parents Under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
63, 84–85 (2006); Philip G. Peters, Jr., Health Courts?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 227, 262–63 (2008). 
 225. Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 902 (3d Cir. 1995) (referencing Hummel v. Heckler, 
736 F.2d 91, 93 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
 226. See Steinberg, supra note 95 at 754–56 (examples of the various procedural 
protections that unrepresented litigants have difficulty exercising). 
 227. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400 (1971). 
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individuals, it is logical to import the methods and ethos of public benefits 
adjudication into the private law cases of the judicial system.228 
The Supreme Court recently acknowledged the wisdom of importing 
administrative-like procedures into the civil courts. In Turner v. Rogers, a 
pro se civil contemnor owing $5,000 in child support debt botched fact 
development in his case and landed himself in jail for twelve months 
despite the possibility that he could have asserted a valid defense.229 In its 
opinion, the Court held that the Due Process Clause requires the courts 
to provide assistance to unrepresented civil contemnors in developing 
their legal claims and facts.230 The Turner decision never mentions the 
judge as the purveyor of such assistance, but it does mandate that the 
alleged contemnor be provided an opportunity to “respond to statements 
and questions” about a common affirmative defense,231 and the judge is 
the most likely court actor to assume that role. Even if the Court intended 
that court clerks and case managers, rather than the judge, provide the 
additional assistance, it is significant that, at least in one context, trial 
courts are now constitutionally obligated to act more like administrative 
tribunals in proactively serving the unrepresented.232 
Importantly, functional uniformity can be achieved on the affirmative 
judging model without imposing a rigid set of rules on judges. In SSA 
proceedings, judges retain substantial discretion in determining the 
robustness with which they pursue case development. For one, the 
affirmative duty on ALJs does not require exploration of every possible 
avenue; individual judges can place appropriate limits on factual 
 
 228. Id. (proclaiming that administrative procedure should emphasize the informal over 
the formal and should not be comfortable only for trained attorneys).  Ironically, there is now a 
much higher rate of representation in SSA cases than there is in the civil courts.  See SOC. SEC. 
ADVISORY BD., ASPECTS OF DISABILITY DECISION MAKING: DATA AND MATERIALS 60 (2012), 
http://www.lb7.uscourts.gov/documents/1-11-CV-00224.pdf (reporting that the attorney 
representation rate in SSA cases tends to hover between seventy and eighty percent, which is 
double the rate of representation that existed in these proceedings in the 1970s, when 
Richardson v. Perales was decided and the ALJ’s fact gathering role was cemented). 
 229. Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 437–38 (2011). 
 230. See id. at 455. 
 231. Id. at 434 (showing the Turner Court did not consider or answer any of the difficult 
questions posed by the prospect of an enhanced judicial role, nor did it explicitly address the 
potential break with adversary norms and ethical rules posed by active judging). 
 232. See Steinberg, supra note 95, at 789 (arguing that Turner implicitly authorizes a more 
proactive role for judges). 
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inquiry.233 In addition, ALJs are encouraged to take into account litigant 
ability and demeanor in crafting their judging style in individual 
matters.234 The affirmative judging framework offers an appropriate set of 
standards within which the judge can operate without resorting to a 
purely ad hoc approach. 
While an affirmative judging model might be criticized for 
demanding a substantial outlay of additional resources by cash-strapped 
trial courts, the degree of additional expense is somewhat unclear. As Part 
IV suggests, courts are already deploying active judging techniques in 
many courtrooms. It is possible that courts may find it more efficient to 
extend regularized judicial assistance to the unrepresented than to allow 
them to flounder, commit mistakes, and deplete the clerks’ time with 
repeated questions—only to return to court over and over again to 
prosecute the same claim.235 This is not to dismiss concerns over limited 
resources out-of-hand, but rather to place the issue in the context of 
inefficiencies already present in the civil courts, some of which may be 
offset by an affirmative judging model.236 
 
 233. See, e.g., Kendrick v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 455, 458 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Hess v. Sec’y 
of Health, Ed. & Welfare, 497 F.2d 837, 840 (3d Cir. 1974). 
 234. Hennig v. Gardner, 276 F. Supp. 622, 625 (N.D. Tex. 1967) (noting that one’s 
nerves or education level may affect the credibility of facts, and holding that judge has a stronger 
duty when litigant skill level is low). 
 235. In one hearing, I observed firsthand in a local domestic violence court, a petitioner 
had returned to court eighteen times without successfully completing service of process. The 
judge continued to hear her case in open court, but would not direct her on the procedure for 
pursuing an alternative form of service. A judge’s refusal to assist is, therefore, not cost-neutral, 
as the same parties may return to court again and again in pursuit of the same relief. 
 236. The matter of resources within the trial courts deserves greater attention. In 2012, 
approximately 1300 judges handled 816,575 individual SSA cases—averaging out to 628 
hearings per judge. See Workload of SSA’s Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), fiscal years 2009–
2012, SOC. SEC. OFFICE RET. & DISABILITY POL’Y, http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs
/statcomps/supplement/2013/2f8-2f11.html (last visited Sep. 21, 2016). The high-intensity 
SSA caseload has led to delays of an average of sixteen months in case processing, forcing 
claimants to go without much-needed government benefits for the duration of the delay. The 
civil courts are stretched even thinner. See Kelli Kennedy, Some Struggle To Live While Waiting 
More Than 2 Years For Social Security Disability Hearings, U.S. NEWS (Nov. 28, 2015) 
http://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2015/11/28/long-wait-times-plague-social-
security-disability-process. In 2014, in Massachusetts, forty-six family court and probate judges 
handled 156,531 matters, averaging out to 3403 cases per judge. See Probate & Family Court 
Justices, MASS. CT. SYS., http://www.mass.gov/courts/court-info/trial-court/pfc/pfc-
justices-gen.html (last visited Sep. 21, 2016); see also Probate & Family Court All Cases Filed By 
Division Fiscal Year 2014, MASS. CT. SYS. (2014), http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/courts-
and-judges/courts/probate-and-family-court/summarystats2014.pdf. Not every family law or 
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3. Building on adversary evolution in complex litigation 
Transformation of the judicial role in majority pro se courts will 
necessarily look different than it does in the arena of complex litigation, 
but it is aimed at a similar purpose. In big federal cases, judges are 
authorized intervene at the moments of greatest complexity, namely 
during pre- and post-trial phases of litigation when the parties are sorting 
through procedural issues, narrowing claims, determining areas of 
agreement, combing through mountains of discovery, and subsequently, 
implementing injunctive relief that may require dramatic changes within 
large institutions.237 
In majority pro se courts, the moment of complexity occurs at a 
different point in time: in open court, when the parties are asked to 
develop the factual record. Many low-level civil cases implicate the 
fundamentally important issues of safety, shelter, stability, and 
parenthood.238 That the cases are routine, involve only two parties, and 
are not legally complex does not diminish the significance and impact of 
the outcomes on the individuals involved. Without attorneys, fact 
development in these matters becomes a complex endeavor for parties to 
pursue on their own—one that may be exacerbated by lack of education, 
poor record-keeping, limited access to technology, unreliable witnesses, 
and language barriers. The need for a more active judge in big, federal 
cases is no greater than it is in small cases. In fact, the devastating 
consequences of bankruptcy, homelessness, or family violence can have 
far-reaching social effects that impact communities in ways as significant 
as do the disputes of corporate entities and the unconstitutional conduct 
of government actors. An affirmative judging model is an appropriate 
judging framework for addressing the type of complexity that emerges in 
the typical two-party case, and would serve as a parallel model to the type 
of active judging that is routine in large federal cases. 
 
probate case requires substantial judicial intervention; many settle early or involve a party who 
defaults. See, e.g., Peter Robinson, An Empirical Study of Settlement Conference Nuts and Bolts: 
Settlement Judges Facilitating Communication, Compromise and Fear, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. 97, 105–06 (2012) (noting that most family law cases settle at settlement conferences). 
Nonetheless, enormous caseloads present a challenge to the affirmative judging model and 
potentially call for a renewed assessment of the allocation of resources within courts. At a 
minimum, courts might consider collecting data on how often judges interact with parties in 
open court to determine the frequency with which an affirmative duty would be triggered and 
the level of resources this could require. 
 237. See supra Section II.B. 
 238. Steinberg, supra note 95, at 749. 
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B. Affirmative Judging and Procedural Values 
In promoting fact development, the affirmative judging model 
bolsters three important procedural values that adversary process fails to 
advance in many two-party civil cases: impartial decision making, party 
participation, and transparency. Many of the presumed benefits of 
adversary procedure—many of the values it ostensibly advances—have 
come apart at the seams in confronting the unrepresented majority. 
Affirmative judging is not a perfect procedural model and does not 
address all of the barriers to effective pro se litigation; however, it offers a 
reasonable and feasible framework for protecting commonly invoked 
elements of fair process. 
1. Impartial decision-making 
There is perhaps no bigger indicator of a fair hearing than an impartial 
judge.239 The parties must view the decision-maker as neutral and 
independent in order to experience the outcome as just. As one judge 
stressed, an “independent and unbiased adjudicator is such an essential 
element of accurate decision making that without it there may never be 
due process.”240 
The passive norm is often defended as protective of impartial 
decision-making,241 and indeed, through the lens of an individual case, a 
judge who refuses assistance to both parties may appear to maintain 
neutrality. Certainly, in withholding assistance universally, the judge 
guards against the instinct to develop only those legal and factual issues 
that comport with pre-existing beliefs about the merit of the parties’ 
claims. In addition, passive judging may boost the perception of neutrality 
because both parties are treated alike, or because the judge’s restraint itself 
communicates an air of detachment. 
Judicial conduct that appears impartial at the individual case level, 
however, looks very different on an entire docket of pro se matters. When 
 
 239. Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values 
of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 457 (1986); see also Harold J. Krent & Lindsay 
DuVall, Accommodating ALJ Decision Making Independence with Institutional Interests of the 
Administrative Judiciary, 25 J. NAT’L ASSN. ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 1 (2005). 
 240. Judith K. Meierhenry, The Due Process Right to an Unbiased Adjudicator in 
Administrative Proceedings, 36 S.D. L. REV. 551, 554 (1991). 
 241. Landsman, Brief Survey, supra note 26, at 714–15. 
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most cases involve an unrepresented party, passive judging is much harder 
to justify as a means of impartial decision-making. Rather than reinforce 
neutrality, passive judging results in systemic partiality toward 
represented, or more skilled, parties who can capitalize on their 
opponents’ confusion to gain control over the facts and issues to be 
considered in each case.242 This may help explain why housing 
proceedings are sometimes singled out as particularly unfair to 
unrepresented parties. In case after case on a housing court docket, the 
judge is quite likely to render a decision on the basis of evidence 
submitted by the landlord without any real consideration of the tenant’s 
under-articulated rebuttal.243 While the judge might technically be 
considered “neutral,” since neither the landlord nor the tenant benefits 
from assistance, the systemic result of the judge’s passivity is to enable 
landlords to dominate the court proceedings. 
Researchers in Baltimore City’s rent court offer concrete evidence 
that systemic partiality can overtake civil proceedings in which one party 
is unrepresented. In a wide-ranging study of housing court practices, the 
researchers found that, in eviction pleadings, more than sixty-five percent 
of landlords reported incomplete or invalid licensing and registration 
information to the court, and over eighty percent reported outdated or 
inaccurate information about compliance with lead inspection 
requirements.244 Although such deficiencies in the pleadings could have 
formed the basis of a tenant defense, the judges did not typically 
interrogate the veracity of the landlords’ claims, and facially improper 
cases were thus allowed to proceed.245 
The passive norm also undermines the perception of impartial 
decision-making among pro se parties, and this too is especially significant 
 
 242. Two state court judges from Maryland note that “judicial passivity itself can create a 
lopsided process from which a non-neutral outcome can [result] . . . .” Wilson & Hutchins, 
supra note 123, at 54. In pro se proceedings, the judges note that passivity from the bench might 
result in the judge not hearing relevant evidence or facts, the litigant feeling too intimidated to 
share his story, and the litigant not bringing forward important issues due to legal confusion. Id. 
at 54–55. 
 243. Bezdek, supra note 90, at 540; Michele Cotton, A Case Study on Access to Justice and 
How to Improve It, 16 J. L. SOC’Y 61, 81 (2014). 
 244. PUB. JUSTICE CTR., supra note 110, at 25–26 (2015), http://www.publicjustice.org
/uploads/file/pdf/JUSTICE_DIVERTED_PJC_DEC15.pdf. 
 245. Id. at 25–26, 37. 
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when there is an asymmetry of representation or power.246 In one study, 
welfare “[a]ppellants perceived ‘quiet’ or ‘passive’ ALJs as biased” in favor 
of the agency—not because the ALJ was employed by the agency, but 
because the ALJ allowed the agency’s representative to manage the 
hearing.247 Even though pro se parties are typically offered an opportunity 
to present evidence, they may feel ill-equipped to take advantage of the 
moment, thus leaving intact the impression that the judge is ceding the 
floor to the skilled opponent. 
Because the passive norm strongly favors represented parties who 
have access to knowledge and resources, affirmative judging for the 
unrepresented would merely tilt the balance back toward neutral. The 
model fortifies impartiality by creating a clear pathway for the 
unrepresented to present their facts, thereby increasing the likelihood 
that judicial fact-finding, rather than structural bias, will drive 
decision-making. 
At the same time, affirmative judging would not unduly jeopardize 
the judge’s ability to remain neutral in individual cases. A number of 
scholars have made the point that judicial engagement does not 
automatically eradicate judicial neutrality—and of course, the experience 
of civil law systems and our SSA system demonstrates that this is so.248 
Richard Zorza has argued that judicial accommodations for the 
unrepresented, such as those embraced by the Model Code, and discussed 
in Part III, are justified in that they lead to a fuller airing of both sides to 
a dispute, thereby privileging actual neutrality over the appearance of 
neutrality.249 As Zorza puts it, “passivity tends to appear neutral when it 
is not and . . . engagement is more likely to appear non-neutral when it is 
 
 246. N.Y. CTY. LAWYERS’ ASS’N., REPORT: THE NEW YORK CITY HOUSING COURT IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY:CAN IT BETTER ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS BEFORE IT? 12 (2005), 
http://www. citylimits. org/images_pdfs/pdfs/HousingCourtReport.pdf. 
 247. Vicki Lens, Revisiting the Promise of Kelly v. Goldberg in the Era of Welfare Reform, 
21 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 43, 76 (2013). 
 248. In 2007, the Model Code of Judicial Conduct was amended to apply to 
Administrative Law Judges, meaning that the affirmative duty required of ALJs within the SSA 
system has been deemed compatible with the canon of impartiality. MODEL CODE OF JUD. 
CONDUCT app. I(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). So, there is already recognition that impartiality 
and active judging are not mutually exclusive. 
 249. Zorza, supra note 170, at 434. 
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in fact neutral.”250 The affirmative judging model is premised on the 
notion that engagement with the unrepresented merely neutralizes the 
playing field, rather than providing an advantage to one side.251 
There is always a risk that judges might focus on eliciting information 
that confirms pre-conceived notions about a case. However, requiring 
judges to explore a number of common claims or defenses in each matter 
can minimize this risk. At first blush, such a suggestion appears onerous, 
but in many pro se cases, only a few possible claims or defenses exist. For 
instance, in most eviction cases involving nonpayment of rent, the tenant 
can only defend against the action by raising one of a handful of possible 
defenses: that she did pay the rent, that the landlord waived his right to 
the rent, or that the landlord breached his duties under the implied 
warranty of habitability.252 If impartiality, at a systemic level, is at least 
partly defined as decision-making that weighs equally the evidence 
available to both parties, then a judge who asks a series of well-crafted 
questions in each case is more likely to advance that goal than a judge 
who adopts the uncontested allegations of a single party as fact. 
Affirmative judging would enable unrepresented parties to submit at least 
some of their relevant facts into the record, and could play a role in 
negating the perception that judges are subject to capture by agency 
personnel or by powerful private parties.253 
2. Party participation 
Party participation in the courts, and in government more broadly, is 
not only an important procedural value, but a fundamental American 
value. We see it as critical that those affected by decisions have the 
opportunity to participate in, voice concerns about, and shape the 
outcome of those decisions. Procedural justice scholars have offered 
 
 250. Id.; see also Sward, Values, supra note 22, at 355 n.96 (pointing out that “[t]here is 
some tendency in the literature to confuse impartiality with passivity. The two concepts must be 
distinguished. A judge can be impartial but very active in developing the case, as judges are in 
the continental inquisitorial systems. Impartiality is a requirement for fair adjudication, but 
judicial passivity is not.”). 
 251. See Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 210, at 2023; Gray, Reaching Out, supra 
note 126, at 105. 
 252. See, e.g., N.Y. CTS. ACCESS TO JUSTICE PROGRAM, TENANT QUESTIONS AND 
ANSWERS: NONPAYMENT EVICTION CASES IN NEW YORK STATE: DISTRICT, CITY, TOWN & 
VILLAGE COURTS OUTSIDE NEW YORK CITY 3–4 (2011), https://www.nycourts.gov/
courthelp/pdfs/TenantsGuide_nonpayment.pdf. 
 253. Lens, supra note 247, at 84–85. 
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theoretical grounding for the value of party participation by positing that 
it leads to voluntary compliance with governmental decisions.254 This can 
be particularly important in the court setting, as parties are often directed 
to fulfill the terms of a judicial order in the absence of substantial 
court oversight. 
Adversary procedure purports to promote party voice, and 
consequently, dignity and autonomy as well.255 Through the norm of 
party control, parties dictate how their stories are framed and conveyed, 
decide whether particular issues or facts are raised, and present witnesses 
and evidence without substantial judicial intervention. In theory, then, 
the adversary system grants parties freedom and flexibility to shape their 
narratives in an intentional manner to advance their personal goals. 
Indeed, the primary justification for adversary procedure in modern times 
relates to its emphasis on party participation.256 
When attorneys can provide the necessary professional expertise to 
help develop the parties’ narratives, adversary procedure does indeed 
promote the value of party participation. In the pro se setting, however, 
the norm of party control suppresses voice, autonomy, and dignity, rather 
than advancing these important dimensions of fair process. Only 
represented parties benefit from maximum freedom in developing the 
content of their cases; the unrepresented are further disassociated from 
the court process when they are burdened with too much responsibility 
for developing the record. 
Judicial accommodations—even those that relax certain procedural 
rules—are not sufficient to revive the relationship between adversary 
process and party participation. Several jurisdictions now permit judges 
to allow narrative testimony from pro se parties, and yet, as discussed in 
Part III with regards to Anita’s hypothetical case, even this substantial 
procedural modification may not enable meaningful case participation.257 
Research conducted by William O’Barr and John Conley confirms 
that narrative testimony can be problematic for unrepresented parties. In 
their linguistic and ethnographic study of fifty-five small claims hearings 
 
 254. See Nourit Zimerman & Tom. R. Tyler, Between Access to Counsel and Access to Justice: 
A Psychological Perspective, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 473, 482–83 (2010). 
 255. Kessler, supra note 35, at 1212–13, 1258; Sward, Values, supra note 22, at 317–18; 
see also Landsman, Brief Survey, supra note 26, at 738. 
 256. See Sward, Values, supra note 22, at 317–18. 
 257. See supra Part III. 
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in two jurisdictions, O’Barr and Conley found that pro se parties who 
testify in narrative form tend to leave out legally relevant facts.258 As 
illustration, they highlight the case of a man whose suit was damaged at 
the dry cleaner.259 Although the plaintiff presented substantial evidence of 
the damaged suit, he did not address the legally significant issues of 
blame, agency, and responsibility, and the judge did not probe for these 
facts.260 As a result, the man did not collect damages.261 In a second 
example, O’Barr and Conley describe a woman who offered undisputed 
testimony regarding a faulty car engine she bought from a garage, but 
failed to advance facts related to her contractual relationship with the 
garage, and therefore did not recover her losses.262 
The parties in O’Barr and Conley’s examples cannot be said to have 
meaningfully participated in their cases. Although both were given wide 
berth to present their stories in narrative form, they left out critical facts 
that may well have existed and these omissions robbed their narratives of 
legal sufficiency.  
Bryan Camp concurs that unrepresented parties experience “serious 
barriers to voice.”263 Relying on an in-depth analysis of the Internal 
Revenue Service’s collection process, he argues that the unrepresented 
lack the substantive expertise to prosecute their cases, and therefore, 
cannot ensure that the decision-maker considers the right facts.264 Even 
parties who interact with the judge directly, and appear to voice their 
concerns, do not participate meaningfully if they are not encouraged to 
share relevant facts that will have a substantial bearing on the decision. 
Counterintuitive to conventional thinking, affirmative judging has 
the capacity to augment the voice of an unrepresented party. Through 
the affirmative model, the judge would cultivate active party participation 
in the case by drawing out testimony and evidence that the litigant might 
not recognize as significant. Even if an active judicial role diminishes 
certain traditional measures of party voice, such as the freedom to order 
 
 258. See William M. O’Barr & John M. Conley, Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal Adequacy 
in Small Claims Court Narratives, 19 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 661, 661–62 (1985). 
 259. Id. at 685. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 686–88. 
 263. Bryan T. Camp, The Failure of Adversarial Process in the Administrative State, 84 IND. 
L. J. 57, 124 (2009). 
 264. Id. at 124–25. 
DOCUMENT6 (DO NOT DELETE) 8/18/2016  5:51 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
962 
 
evidence in a manner of one’s choosing, it would serve more important 
measures, such as the party’s ability to communicate all facts to the judge 
in a way that the judge can digest and follow.265 The adversary system 
does not truly contemplate direct party-to-judge communication as a way 
of fostering party participation. The assumption has always been that an 
attorney develops the case, and serves as a proxy for the party in 
presenting it to the court.266 While attorney representation may still 
present the best model for promoting party voice, it is no longer a reliable 
way to advance the value of participation in most two-party civil cases. 
The judge is by no means a perfect substitute for an attorney, but in 
devising non-leading questions that are reasonably likely to elicit relevant 
information, the judge can enable the party to become a more full-fledged 
participant in the hearing than the party is likely to achieve on her own. 
O’Barr and Conley conclude from their study on small claims 
narratives that many of the participation barriers lay litigants face could 
be resolved by judges with the “time, inclination, and ability to intervene” 
with follow-up questions.267 They hone in on one judge who formulated 
a legal theory and dutifully tested it by questioning the parties—with the 
result that the unrepresented plaintiff achieved the outcome she sought. 
The authors believe that, in taking an active approach, the judge aided 
the party’s participation, and was therefore able to render a more 
exacting decision.268  
Barbara Bezdek draws similar conclusions from extensive research in 
a Baltimore housing court.269 Bezdek argues that unstructured narrative 
can diminish party voice, as the tenant will often offer a “relational” 
account of the story by focusing on social interactions, status, and the 
history of relationships between the parties, rather than ordering their 
accounts by legal theories or rules, leading judges to dismiss their 
narratives.270 She suggests that judges should elicit appropriate discourse 
 
 265. See O’Barr & Conley, supra note 258, at 696 (making the point that unrepresented 
litigants can benefit from the assistance of a magistrate who helps them organize their testimony 
and address all legally significant issues). 
 266. Engler, supra note 210, at 1988. 
 267. O’Barr & Conley, supra note 258, at 696. 
 268. Id. at 690–96. 
 269. Bezdek, supra note 90, at 533–35. 
 270. Id. at 587–88. 
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from pro se parties in order to promote litigant voice.271  Such research 
supports the notion that active judging might aid the important value of 
party participation in pro se cases. 
3. Transparency 
Transparency is another crucial feature of fair process. A transparent 
court is defined as one that reveals “all relevant aspects of its operation.”272 
Procedural transparency is particularly important, as parties must be 
advised of how the court will adjudicate their cases so that they may 
prepare and adjust their expectations. A lack of transparency can 
undermine the trustworthiness of the judiciary and alienate the public’s 
faith in a fair process.273 Furthermore, it can be difficult to evaluate or 
refine procedure when courts do not disclose their methods or engage in 
conduct that comports with written norms.274 
Our criminal courts are transparent; the courts purport to abide by 
adversary norms, and do indeed proceed accordingly. In the civil courts, 
however, public doctrine commands adherence to adversary procedure, 
and yet many judges invent alternatives.275 The rise of the unrepresented 
majority has forced many judges to confront the unsuitability of 
employing adversary procedure on their dockets, resulting in significant 
variation in procedural habits. Moreover, an odd silence surrounds 
judges’ on-the-ground practices, with virtually no public 
acknowledgement of the departures from adversary procedure now 
common in two-party cases. The two-party civil system is now likely the 
setting where the least transparency exists regarding adjudicatory 
practices. In housing, family law, and consumer courts, there is virtually 
no recognition that judges regularly depart from the passive norm or that 
litigants might be subject to widely differing procedural methods in court. 
The affirmative judging framework would elevate transparency and 
accountability in majority pro se courts by creating a visible standard of 
practice that litigants can rely on in ordering their affairs. It is unrealistic 
to expect judges to remain passive in pro se matters if they seek to reach 
 
 271. Id. 
 272. Lynn M. LoPucki, Court-System Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV. 481, 483 (2009). 
 273. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Managerial Judge Goes to Trial, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 
1261, 1324 (2010) (noting that when a court lacks transparency, it “deters the development of 
standards, prevents the monitoring of impact, and undermines the trustworthiness of 
the judiciary”). 
 274. See id. 
 275. See supra Part IV. 
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merits-based decisions. A better approach is to develop norms of conduct 
that judges can abide by, and then make those norms public so that parties 
understand how their proceedings will unfold. 
Transparent procedures are particularly important if the affirmative 
judging model is to work in cases involving asymmetrical representation, 
where one party is represented and the other is not. Judicial intervention, 
if not authorized or required by clear guidelines, can raise the specter of 
prejudice against a represented party, who might be blindsided by atypical 
procedures. Indeed, this was the case in Inquiry Concerning Broadman,276 
where the judge relaxed traditional procedures for the unrepresented 
party, but was subsequently censured when the opponent’s attorney 
complained that he received no advance notice that the “trial would 
proceed in an alternative order.”277 If, however, attorneys can predict 
what judges will ask and how they will ask it, they will feel better equipped 
to prepare clients to testify, and will be able to shift their focus to 
supplementing the record rather than presenting a case in chief. 
No procedural system that vests discretion in the judge will be entirely 
transparent. In complex litigation, for example, managerial judging has 
often been criticized for its lack of transparency, owing to off-the-record 
settlement conferences that are regularly held in closed chambers.278 In 
that setting, however, attorneys are typically present for both parties and 
a range of manuals and best practices are available to guide judicial 
conduct.279 While challenging a judge’s aggressive settlement tactics may 
still present difficulties, transparency exists in the sense that official court 
rules acknowledge the practice and discuss a range of acceptable judicial 
actions.280 The predictability of any system will never be precise, but 
unrepresented parties compound the problem immeasurably. The 
affirmative judging model does not aim for absolute transparency, as 
judges will need to retain discretion in the way they carry out fact 
development, but it proposes a basic procedural framework that is 
reliable, delineated, and capable of serving the needs of most cases. 
 
 276. See Inquiry Concerning Broadman, 48 CAL.4TH CJP SUPP. 67 (Feb. 26, 1999) (No. 
145), http://cjp.ca.gov/res/docs/s_c_cites/Broadman_48_Cal.4th_CJP_Supp._67.pdf. 
 277. Id. at 70–71. 
 278. Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks in Judicial Power in the Era of 
Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41, 73–78 (1995). 
 279. See MANUAL, supra note 86, at 167–82. 
 280. FED. R. CIV. P. 16; see MANUAL, supra note 86, at 167–82. 
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C. Why Not a Discretionary Standard? 
This Section takes on the argument that simply broadening judicial 
discretion to develop the case record, rather than requiring it, would be 
sufficient to address the breakdown in adversary procedure in cases 
involving the unrepresented. To be sure, expanding upon a judge’s 
discretionary powers might be a plausible alternative to an affirmative 
duty, as it would simply legitimize the range of adjudicative methods 
already employed in pro se courts. This Section argues, however, that an 
affirmative duty, and not a discretionary standard, is essential if we aim to 
further fair process. 
While some amount of judicial discretion in the execution of 
procedure is desirable, not to mention inevitable, the decision whether to 
develop the factual record is too fundamental to the outcome of the case 
to be left to an individual judge’s preferences. Indeed, it is unclear 
whether optional fact development on the part of the judge can even 
properly be characterized as an exercise of discretion. In the words of 
Ronald Dworkin, judicial discretion should be viewed as “the hole in a 
doughnut,” hemmed in by “a surrounding belt of restriction.”281 Pauline 
Kim concurs that formal standards must be erected for discretion to be 
capably exercised.282 Granting judges permission to either sit in stony 
silence or to elicit a legally relevant narrative from a party is better 
described as unfettered procedural choice, rather than discretion. 
Essential judicial functions, such as fact-finding, should not have an opt-
out provision. 
A discretionary standard is further problematic in that it invites 
implicit bias to infect judges’ procedural choices. The findings of fourteen 
state task forces confirm that judges are vulnerable to implicit bias against 
women,283 and some research also demonstrates that judges may harbor 
 
 281. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31 (1977). 
 282. Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 408–09 (2007) 
(“[Discretion] suggests that a decision should be made not randomly or arbitrarily, but by 
exercising judgment in light of some applicable set of standards, guidelines, or values. Those 
standards or norms may rule out certain options while still permitting the decisionmaker [sic] to 
exercise some choice.”). 
 283. Jeannette F. Swent, Gender Bias at the Heart of Justice: An Empirical Study of State 
Task Forces, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 1, 55–62 (1996) (analyzing some of the 
findings of fourteen state task forces from the 1990s, which documented serious bias against 
women in the courts—evidenced through poorer substantive outcomes, hostile treatment by 
judges, judicial bias against domestic violence survivors, judicial bias against spousal support, 
judicial bias regarding women’s role and fault in divorce, judicial bias in custody decisions). For 
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implicit biases against racial minorities.284 Moreover, because state court 
judges are voted in and do not have lifetime tenure, they are inherently 
susceptible to political forces that may cause them to favor litigants who 
share their racial, ethnic, gender, and socio-economic characteristics.285  
In other words, state trial courts are already primed for partiality toward 
represented or more powerful litigants, and granting judges discretion to 
decide whether, and to whom, to provide assistance may exacerbate 
those biases.286 
One final drawback to a discretionary standard is that it would fail to 
create a sufficiently robust standard of review. Judicial review enhances 
the visibility of the trial court’s actions and creates an above-board 
standard of conduct that can be honed by the appellate courts. Published 
decisions help develop and define best practices so that judges have 
standards to rely on, rather than simply a license to improvise. Under a 
discretionary regime, pro se parties would have very little opportunity to 
challenge a judge’s refusal to grant assistance. The accommodation 
doctrine described in Part IV is discretionary in most jurisdictions and 
provides a window into the difficulty of seeking appellate review, even in 
the face of utterly inconsistent judicial conduct.287 Indeed, an advisory 
benchbook promulgated by California’s Judicial Council takes pains to 
assure judges that any “accommodation” they make, or choose to not 
make, is virtually immune to challenge.288 Specifically, California advises 
its family law judges that, under the current state of the law, any 
 
more on gender and racial bias task forces, see GENDER AND RACIAL FAIRNESS RESOURCE 
GUIDE, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., www.ncsc.org/topics/access-and-fairness/gender-and-
racial-fairness/resource-guide.aspx (last visited Sept. 24, 2016). 
 284. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1195 (2009). 
 285. See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality and 
Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95, 129, 131, 139 (1997) (discussing the 
political forces affecting judicial elections and making the point that gender and racial diversity 
on the bench may affect judicial attitudes toward minority issues and perspectives). 
 286. It is also possible that judges, in an attempt to assist historically disadvantaged groups, 
will go in the opposite direction, and like Judge Weinstein in Floyd v. Cosi, Inc., 78 F.Supp.3d 
558 (E.D. N.Y. 2015), will ask leading, rather than neutral, questions in an effort to help the 
pro se party—leading to a claim of bias from the opponent. 
 287. See supra note 148. 
 288. See JUD. COUNCIL OF CA., HANDLING CASES INVOLVING SELF-REPRESENTED 
LITIGANTS: A BENCHGUIDE FOR JUDICIAL OFFICERS 3–7 (2007), http://www.courts. ca.gov
/documents/benchguide_self_rep_litigants.pdf. 
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accommodation they make will always be affirmed if the adjustments do 
not prejudice the other side.289 Additionally, any refusal by judges to make 
an adjustment will always be affirmed unless the refusal is manifestly 
unreasonable or unfair.290 Indeed, the benchbook accurately captures the 
difficulty of challenging judicial action under an abuse of discretion 
standard. In order to carve out a legitimate pathway to appeal, judicial 
development of the factual record must be required. It is only because an 
affirmative duty on judges is present in the SSA context that the district 
courts’ reversal rate of ALJ decisions exceeds fifty percent.291 
The sufficiency of the record in millions of pro se cases is, or should 
be, an issue of critical importance to the justice system, and one that 
demands far greater participation by appellate courts in setting and 
perfecting standards. An affirmative duty would create a proper standard 
of review, requiring remand of a case for further development of the 
record where the judge does not fulfill her duty, unless the error is 
harmless. In SSA matters, cases are routinely remanded for additional fact 
development, resulting in a doctrine far more sophisticated and fine-
tuned in delineating judicial obligations than exists for trial judges in the 
civil courts.292 In Brown v. Shalala, for example, the court found 
“evidentiary gaps” in the record evidenced by the judge’s failure to review 
relevant medical documents and to question the claimant’s husband 
following his testimony regarding the claimant’s mental state.293 The case 
was remanded for further fact gathering and the judge was deemed in 
violation of his duty to develop the record.294 
The specter of judicial review, and the promulgation of more exacting 
standards, has a significant effect: ALJs award disability benefits in sixty 
percent of SSA cases.295 To provide additional meaning to that statistic, 
 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 679, 704–05 (2002). 
 292. See, e.g., Fred-Perez v. Barnhart, 450 F. Supp. 2d 461, 466 (D. Del. 2006) (“The 
Court has reviewed the A.L.J.’s decision and concludes that this matter should be remanded for 
further development of the record. In social security cases, the A.L.J. is charged with the duty 
to develop a full and fair record.”). 
 293. 44 F.3d 931, 935–36 (11th Cir. 1995). 
 294. Id. at 936. 
 295. Damian Paletta, Disability-Claim Judge Has Trouble Saying ‘No’, WALL ST. J. (May 
19, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704681904576319163605
DOCUMENT6 (DO NOT DELETE) 8/18/2016  5:51 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
968 
 
the affirmative duty on ALJs in the SSA context results in the award of 
benefits to more than 400,000 individuals annually who previously had 
been denied benefits by frontline bureaucrats in a two-phase review of the 
paper record.296 Compare that to a study conducted in Baltimore where 
only eight percent of renters were successful in raising a habitability 
defense, even though researchers found that seventy-eight percent of 
those brought to court “were living amidst serious housing defects.”297 A 
mandatory system of fact development, coupled with meaningful access 
to judicial review, is necessary if outcomes in the civil courts are to mirror 
those obtained in administrative tribunals such as the SSA. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The role of judge as a neutral and impartial arbiter is ingrained in the 
American conception of justice. Judges expect the parties to develop the 
factual and legal substance of a case, and to do so within the bounds of 
accepted procedural and evidentiary rules. A judge’s job is not to assist 
with this endeavor in any manner, but rather to respond to the parties’ 
actions with rulings appropriate to the circumstances. And yet, there is 
precedent for departing from traditional norms when they prove 
outdated. In the arena of complex litigation, a huge transformation in the 
judicial role has taken place, with judges now playing a much more 
prominent role in managing large-scale cases than ever before. 
Just as the expansion of civil rights and the advent of the class action 
lawsuit altered the legal landscape in the 1960s and 1970s by requiring 
new modes of judicial adjudication in complex litigation, so too does the 
recent rise of an unrepresented majority create the conditions necessary 
 
918524; SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BD., ASPECTS OF DISABILITY DECISION MAKING: DATA AND 
MATERIALS 58 (2014), http://www.lb7.uscourts.gov/documents/1-11-CV-00224.pdf. 
 296. David Fahrenhold, The Biggest Backlog in the Federal Government, WASH. POST (Oct. 
18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2014/10/18/the-biggest-
backlog-in-the-federal-government/ (noting that in fiscal year 2014, the SSA had an incoming 
caseload of 810,715 matters.  Because ALJs grant benefits in approximately sixty-percent of 
cases, they award benefits to more than 400,000 claimants who were previously rejected by 
agency personnel). Note that some scholars have been critical of the ALJs in the SSA system 
because of their extraordinarily high grant rate. See Richard Pierce, What Should We Do About 
Social Security Disability Appeals?, REG., Fall 2011, at 34–37, 
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2011/9/regv34n3-
3.pdf. 
 297. PUB. JUSTICE CTR., supra note 110, at v. 
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for modification of the judicial role in two-party cases. A judge who 
presides over regular, everyday disputes in state courts may interact with 
as many as one hundred pro se parties daily, very few of whom can 
effectively discharge their duties under the norm of party control.298 
Indeed, a judge who spends all day, every day with the unrepresented, 
and yet refuses to descend from the passive perch, might find it difficult 
to ever discharge her duties to weigh facts, resolve disputes, and enforce 
the substantive law. Judges are aware of this dynamic, and many are 
engaging in unsanctioned adversary departures in an effort to determine 
the merits of a case. A better approach would involve imposing an 
affirmative duty on judges to develop the record in pro se cases. Such a 
duty would cohere theory, doctrine, and practice, and promote many of 
the procedural values that have been casualties of the clash between 
adversary procedure and the unrepresented. 
  
 
 298. Leslie Eaton & Leslie Kaufman, In Problem-Solving Court, Judges Turn Therapist, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2005), http://nyti.ms/1SYOm2N. 
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